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INTRODUCTION
The year 2008 found the American public following two
dramatically different news stories: the divisive, yet exciting,
presidential campaign and that of the struggling American
economy.
Housing prices were plummeting, leading to a
meltdown in the sub-prime mortgage lending arena, Lehman
Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and the government found itself
watching several other American institutions on the verge of
collapsing. Instead of allowing the economy to recover on its
own, the government stepped in and attempted to revive many
corporations, and in turn, the economy, on a much grander scale
than what the American people generally expect of their
∗
This Article addresses the events and legal implications that were present at
the time of publication. It likely will take several years for these issues to be
resolved in their entirety.
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government. 1 One way in which the government began this
attempted revival was through the passage of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (the “Act”), which was signed
into law on October 3, 2008. 2 The Act was created to help
stabilize the American financial system and prevent further
damage—a goal it sought to accomplish through the creation of
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), among other
measures. 3 Through TARP, the government ultimately lent up to
$700 billion to many financial institutions in the hopes of saving
1
The United States is typically assumed to “celebrate[ ] laissez-faire capitalism
as the economic ideal,” but the nation has often drifted from that principle by buying
interests in railways, coal mines, and steel mills when necessary. Steve Lohr, Bold
Action with Basis in History, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A1. One period of history
in which the American government significantly intervened was during the Great
Depression, which began with the stock market crash of 1929. See generally
HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492–PRESENT 386–87
(Harper Perennial Modern Classics reprint 2005) (2001) (describing the stock
market crash of 1929). During this time, more than five thousand banks shut their
doors, large numbers of businesses closed, and approximately fifteen million people,
or one-quarter to one-third of the labor force, were out of work. Id. at 387. In order to
alleviate the situation, the government created many programs, including the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation started by President Hoover. DAVID M.
KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR,
1929–1945, at 84 (2005). Often described as “bank relief,” Congress capitalized the
program at $500 million and authorized it to borrow up to an additional $1.5 billion.
Id. The program provided “emergency loans to banks, building-and-loan societies,
railroads, and agricultural stabilization corporations.” Id. The government also
intervened in the economy through a variety of programs known as the “New Deal,”
which collectively either created entities that provided jobs for Americans or
increased the regulatory power of the American government, or both. See generally
id. at 364–80 (discussing generally the variety of programs created under the New
Deal, including the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the National Labor Relations Board).
2
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765.
3
See id. § 101. The official purposes of the Act are as follows:
(1) to immediately provide authority and facilities that the Secretary of the
Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of
the United States; and (2) to ensure that such authority and such facilities
are used in a manner that—(A) protects home values, college funds,
retirement accounts, and life savings; (B) preserves homeownership and
promotes jobs and economic growth; (C) maximizes overall returns to the
taxpayers of the United States; and (D) provides public accountability for
the exercise of such authority.
Id. § 2, 122 Stat. at 3766 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5201 (West 2011)). The Act also
included the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 in division B, and the
Tax Extenders and the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of
2008 in division C. Id. div. B–C, 122 Stat. at 3807–933 (codified in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
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them from collapse. 4 The government gave billions more to other
corporations in the form of mortgage-backed security purchases,
direct investments, loan guarantees, and loans, totaling over
$1.33 trillion. 5 The government then became a creditor of many
major corporations, as well as a majority or controlling
shareholder in some situations. 6 A year after the crisis started
and on the anniversary of Lehman Brothers’ collapse, President
Barack Obama addressed Wall Street bankers, advising them to
“embrace serious financial reform, not fight it.” 7
In the case of Bank of America, the government simply
loaned money, first through TARP to help it survive, and later
lent more to help it buy another failing financial institution,
Merrill Lynch. 8 In September 2008, Bank of America agreed to
purchase Merrill Lynch, and the shareholders approved the
transaction on December 5, 2008. 9 In agreeing to the transaction
and in persuading shareholders to approve it, Bank of America’s
board of directors relied on representations made in September
2008 as to Merrill Lynch’s financial condition. 10 However, in
Django Gold, Uncle Sam in the Boardroom, DIRECTORSHIP, Feb. 5, 2009, at 23,
available at http://www.directorship.com/uncle-sam-in-the-boardroom/. The TARP
program provided loans to, among others, Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac, Citigroup,
AIG, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, GM, Morgan Stanley,
Goldman Sachs, and Chrysler. Id. at 25.
5
Id. In addition to TARP funds, the government provided debt and mortgagebacked security purchases to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, direct investment and
loan guarantees to Citigroup, and $30 billion to JPMorgan Chase for the Bear
Stearns acquisition. Id.
6
The United States government became a creditor of Bank of America, a
majority shareholder of General Motors, and an owner of thirty-four percent of
Citigroup, which as described in the article, arguably makes Citigroup a controlling
shareholder. See Dan Fitzpatrick et al., U.S.A. Inc.: In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played
Hardball, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played
Hardball]; John D. Stoll & Neil King, Jr., GM Set To Exit Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J.,
July 10, 2009, at A1; David Ellis, It’s Official: You Own a Piece of Citi,
CNNMONEY.COM (July 30, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/07/30/news/companies/
citigroup_stake/index.htm?section=money_latest.
7
Elizabeth Williamson & Damian Paletta, Obama Urges Bankers To Back
Financial Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, at A4 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Lehman Brothers Holdings filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in
September 2008 after the United States government declined to help potential
buyers—including Barclays PLC and Bank of America—finance the purchase of the
struggling company. See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Crisis on Wall Street as Lehman
Totters, Merrill Is Sold, AIG Seeks To Raise Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at A1.
8
See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6.
9
See id. The agreement was previously approved by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve. See id.
10
See id.
4
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mid-December 2008, Bank of America’s board of directors learned
that Merrill Lynch’s financial condition was not as it was
represented to them in September 2008. 11 In fact, it was
significantly worse. 12 Nevertheless, Bank of America went
forward with the transaction, allegedly under pressure from
government officials to complete the transaction and not disclose
the information concerning Merrill Lynch’s financial condition to
shareholders. 13 Alleging that such omissions were material, the
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filed suit against Bank
of America and began investigating why Bank of America did not
disclose Merrill Lynch’s deteriorating financial condition
sooner. 14 While Judge Jed Rakoff dismissed the first settlement
proposed by the parties because it unfairly punished the
shareholders, 15 he eventually—albeit reluctantly—approved a
$150 million settlement in January 2010. 16 Indeed, Judge Rakoff
harshly criticized the settlement and chastised the bank for
“hiding material information from its shareholders,” claiming
that the actions of Bank of America amounted to “fraud.” 17
Furthermore, although the SEC refused to file a suit against any
individual executives, the settlement approval did not thwart a
similar suit from New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo,
who charged the bank and two top executives with civil securities
fraud. 18 While many conflicting accounts exist, this transaction
between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch raises important
legal questions regarding the government’s interaction with and
influence over the private sector. Saving a corporation or
multiple corporations from failure is certainly commendable,
especially when these efforts may significantly help the overall
American economy. However, is it legal, or at the very least good
corporate governance, for boards of directors to yield to
See id.
See id. By mid-December, Merrill Lynch had lost almost $21 billion on a
pretax basis, which constituted approximately $15 billion in net losses. Id. Merrill
Lynch’s fourth quarter losses amounted to $15.31 billion according to the figure
announced to Bank of America shareholders on January 16, 2009. Id.
13
See id.; infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
14
See Dan Fitzpatrick & Kara Scannell, BofA Hit by Fine over Merrill, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 4, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter BofA Hit by Fine over Merrill].
15
Dan Fitzpatrick et al., Rakoff Backs BofA Accord, Unhappily, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 23, 2010, at C1 [hereinafter Rakoff Backs BofA Accord].
16
Id.
17
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
18
See id.
11
12
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governmental pressure and consider the welfare of the overall
American economy, which arguably equates to considering the
American public at large, when making such decisions?
In addition to becoming a creditor, the government also
became either a majority or a controlling shareholder in several
other American corporations, most notably General Motors and
Citigroup. 19 In the case of General Motors, the government
became a sixty percent owner 20 after the corporation emerged
from one of the largest industrial bankruptcies in history. 21 Like
Bank of America, Citigroup initially received funding from the
government through the TARP program 22 and then later
converted the government’s preferred shares to common shares,
thus leaving the government with a thirty-four percent stake in
the corporation. 23 While the government claims that it is a
“reluctant shareholder,” 24 boards have started to consider the
government as a “new addition to their board . . . as activist
Indeed, when the
investor, lawmaker, and regulator.” 25
government owns a significant stake in corporations and also has
the dual role as a governmental regulator, how and when does it
cross the line from only serving as a traditional shareholder? 26
19
The government also became a majority shareholder in AIG, but this Article
will only discuss the government’s involvement with General Motors and Citigroup
due to specific differences between the government’s ownership of AIG and its
involvement in General Motors and Citigroup.
20
John D. Stoll & Kevin Helliker, Board Debut for GM’s New Chairman, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 3, 2009, at B1. Other sources have stated that the U.S. government owns
60.8% of General Motors. Peter Whoriskey, GM Emerges from Bankruptcy After
Landmark Government Bailout, WASH. POST (July 10, 2009), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/10/AR2009071001473.html.
21
Neil King, Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM Collapses into Government’s Arms, WALL
ST. J., June 2, 2009, at A1.
22
Gold, supra note 4, at 25.
23
Ellis, supra note 6. See infra Part I.C for further details regarding the
conversion of Citigroup’s preferred shares to common shares.
24
Neil King, Jr. & Sharon Terlep, supra note 21; see also Fact Sheet on Obama
Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative for General Motors, THE WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Fact-Sheet-on-Obama-AdministrationAuto-Restructuring-Initiative-for-General-Motors/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2011).
25
Gold, supra note 4, at 26.
26
Shareholders are traditionally considered to be the owners of a corporation,
and they elect directors to manage the corporation and to achieve the goal of
maximizing their profits. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the
Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 437 (2006). Shareholders are sometimes
considered the “underpinning of corporate governance” and theoretically can vote
directors out of their positions or sell the shares they own in the corporation to voice
their dissatisfaction. Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable
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For example, when the government begins acting as a
creditor, shareholder, regulator, and stakeholder, 27 many of the
established lines in corporate law blur, and significant questions
emerge as a result of such government intervention. Specifically,
if the government is a creditor, how much is it allowed to
influence the board of directors? What happens when the
government is a majority or controlling shareholder, and its
conduct breaches the fiduciary duty it owes to minority
shareholders? Can boards of directors begin viewing the United
States economy, or the American public, as a stakeholder, in
addition to the “traditional” stakeholders such as employees and
the community? 28
This Article explores these questions and more with respect
to the current role the government is playing in three
corporations—Bank of America, General Motors, and Citigroup—
and the relevant issues raised within corporate law. Specifically,
this Article discusses whether boards of directors may have acted
in such a way that potentially breaches traditional fiduciary
duties—duties of due care, loyalty, and good faith—and whether
the business judgment rule still protects these boards when they
were pressured by the government. Furthermore, this Article
also explores whether there were violations under Rule 10b-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 29 the duty of candor
required in Delaware, and the duty of fairness. This Article also
Impact of Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 349 (2009). There
are two typical types of shareholders: (1) the individual shareholder, who, because
he or she is one of many, is often apathetic regarding participating in governing the
corporation; and (2) institutional shareholders. See id. at 349–50. Institutional
shareholders often have the ability to monitor corporations and become involved in
corporate governance. Id. at 350. The stereotypical institutional investors include
(1) pension funds; (2) mutual funds; (3) insurance companies; (4) foundations;
(5) university and charitable endowments; (6) banks investing trust funds;
(7) brokerage firms; and (8) investment vehicles for sophisticated investors. ROBERT
W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 520 (11th ed. 2010). The
government, as neither an individual nor a group of investors, does not fit into either
category of “normal” shareholders.
27
“Stakeholder” has many definitions, but the term is typically considered to
include the “employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, [and] communit[y]” of a
corporation. Wai Shun Wilson Leung, Note, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy:
A Proposed Corporate Regime that Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587, 622 (1997). Neither the American economy, nor the
American public, has ever been considered a stakeholder.
28
See id.
29
15 U.S.C.A. § 78a (West 2011).
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analyzes the duties the government owes fellow shareholders
when it acts as either a majority or controlling shareholder and
addresses the idea that the U.S. government may be beginning to
engage in what many foreign governments already utilize, the
golden share. Part I discusses the financial crisis of 2008 with
respect to Bank of America, General Motors, and Citigroup. Part
II summarizes the traditional triad of fiduciary duties owed by,
and legal protections provided to, boards of directors under
common law. Part III details the fiduciary duties owed by
directors to shareholders under the duty of candor in Delaware.
Part IV discusses additional relevant laws and issues, including
Rule 10b-5, the duty of directors to be fair to all shareholders,
and the duty of loyalty owed by majority and controlling
shareholders to minority shareholders. Part V analyzes all the
legal implications of the financial crisis of 2008 with respect to
the three profiled companies.
I. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008: THE BACKGROUND TO
DISCUSSING THE GOVERNMENT’S EROSION OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE LAW
The various legal doctrines and laws briefly discussed above
all became very relevant in late 2008 when the American
economy began to crumble. Suddenly, major corporations were
either failing or only surviving after receiving significant
financial assistance from the government. Through the Act,
which was signed into law on October 3, 2008, the government
created TARP to help stabilize the economy. 30 Two programs of
the Act, the Capital Purchase Program and the Capital
Assistance Program, were specifically designed to assist banks by
providing capital. 31 While many major financial institutions and
See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765.
31
The Capital Purchase Program is a voluntary program in which the Treasury
Department provides capital to healthy financial institutions that want additional
capital to ensure stability. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury
Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1207.aspx.
The
program provides additional capital by purchasing banks’ preferred shares on
standardized terms, including warrants for future Treasury Department purchases
of common stock. Id. In return, the financial institutions must pay the Treasury
Department a five percent dividend on senior preferred shares for the first five years
after the investment and nine percent per year thereafter. Id. Two-hundred fifty
billion dollars were allotted to the program. Id. The application period to receive
30
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corporations were impacted, three in particular became
significantly involved with the government: Bank of America,
General Motors, and Citigroup. 32
A.

Bank of America and the Shareholders It Left in the Dark 33

Bank of America initially received $15 billion from TARP as
part of the Capital Purchase Program in fall 2008. 34 Later, Bank
of America CEO and Chairman Ken Lewis stated that this
investment had a “dilutive effect” on existing shareholders and
was not requested by Bank of America, but was instead taken at
the request of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and others. 35
funding under the Capital Purchase Program ended in late 2008 and early 2009 with
due dates varying based on the different types of companies. Capital Purchase
Program, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/investment-programs/cpp/Pages/capitalpurchaseprogram.aspx (last visited
Mar. 16, 2011). The Capital Assistance Program, which the Treasury Department
announced on February 25, 2009, has two objectives: (1) to analyze whether any of
the major American banks need to establish additional capital as a buffer during the
financial crisis; and (2) to provide common equity as a “bridge to private capital in
the future” to qualifying financial institutions. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
TREASURY WHITE PAPER, THE CAPITAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND ITS ROLE IN THE
FINANCIAL STABILITY PLAN 2 (2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/tg40_capwhitepaper.pdf. Additionally, the Automotive Industry
Financing Program, which was also created under TARP, has provided $76 billion in
loans or equity investments to General Motors, GMAC, Chrysler Holding, and
Chrysler Financial, in order to avoid “disorderly bankruptcy.” Automotive Industry
Financing Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/financial-stability/investment-programs/aifp/Pages/autoprogram.aspx
(last visited Mar. 16, 2011).
32
Hundreds of financial institutions and other corporations have been involved
in the programs. For a complete list of which institutions have received funding, how
much funding, what the government received, and who has repaid the government,
see Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
financial-stability/briefing-room/reports/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Mar. 16,
2011).
33
At the time of writing, the current events surrounding Bank of America were
still rapidly evolving.
34
See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
TRANSACTIONS REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING JANUARY 12, 2011, CAPITAL PURCHASE
PROGRAM 1 (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financialstability/briefing-room/reports/tarp-transactions/DocumentsTARPTransactions/1118-10%20Transactions%20Report%20as%20of%2011-16-10.pdf
[hereinafter
TRANSACTIONS REPORT, CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM].
35
Editorial, Busting Bank of America, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2009, at A14
(internal quotation marks omitted). While Lewis did not explain what he meant by
“dilutive effect,” he possibly was referring to the fact that the government received
preferred stock with warrants by injecting capital into Bank of America, thus
diminishing the power of other preferred shareholders. See generally Press Release,
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Then, Bank of America received additional funds to help finance
Bank of America’s purchase of Merrill Lynch. The total amount
the United States provided to the corporation to reach $45
The $45 billion was eventually returned to the
billion. 36
government a year later, on December 9, 2009. 37 While Bank of
America’s shareholders were aware of the $15 billion received in
TARP funds, they were not aware of the additional financing
provided by the government and the terrible financial condition
of Merrill Lynch until Bank of America notified shareholders and
the public in January 2009. 38
To provide a timeline of significant events regarding the
merger of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, on September 15,
2008, after less than forty-eight hours of due diligence, 39 Bank of
America entered into an agreement to purchase Merrill Lynch to
ultimately save the company from collapse. 40 This agreement
was approved by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
on November 26, 2008, and on December 5, 2008, the
shareholders of both Merrill Lynch and Bank of America
approved the transaction. 41 However, by mid-December, Merrill
Lynch’s finances were not what they were when Bank of America
had agreed to purchase the company. 42 In fact, the substantial
losses, some of which remained undisclosed to shareholders even
though they had become known to Bank of America executives

U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program
Description (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www. treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/hp1207.aspx (describing the Capital Purchase Program).
36
Eric Dash et al., Bank of America to Receive $20 Billion More, NY TIMES, Jan.
16, 2009, at B1.
37
David Mildenberg, Bank of America Names Moynihan CEO, Replacing Lewis,
BUS. WK. (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/
dec2009/ db20091216_513214.htm?chan=rss_topStories_ssi_5.
38
See Busting Bank of America, supra note 35.
39
In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6; see also Letter from
Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney Gen., New York, to Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman,
U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs 1 (Apr. 23, 2009)
[hereinafter Cuomo Letter], available at http://www.marketwatch.com/ story/textcuomo-letter-merrill-lynch (“Time was of the essence for Merrill Lynch, as the
company was not likely to survive the following week without a merger.”).
40
See Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn into a
Federal Bailout? Part III: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform, 111th Cong. 23–24 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
Henry M. Paulson, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury).
41
Id. at 22.
42
In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6.
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prior to the shareholder vote, 43 amounted to $13.3 billion in
pretax losses for the preceding two months alone. 44 On December
17, 2008, Lewis flew to Washington to inform federal regulators
that he was considering invoking the material adverse change
(“MAC”) clause to rescind the merger agreement, 45 which was a
legal course of action. 46 According to Lewis, Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke and Paulson pressured Lewis to
continue with the merger agreement but to not inform
shareholders of the newly-discovered details regarding Merrill
Lynch’s financial losses. 47 Government officials warned Lewis
that backing out of the transaction would upset the markets,
ignite lawsuits against Bank of America, and hurt the bank’s
reputation. 48 Furthermore, government officials told Lewis that
future requests for government assistance would lead officials to
contemplate having more control over Bank of America’s
operations. 49 Most importantly, Lewis stated that Paulson
advised him that the government would remove Bank of
America’s board and management if the bank invoked the MAC
clause and backed out of the merger. 50

43
Cuomo Letter, supra note 39, at 2. Bank of America’s CFO, Joseph Price,
informed Lewis that “Merrill Lynch’s financial condition had seriously deteriorated
at an alarming rate.” Id.
44
In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6.
45
A “[m]aterial [a]dverse [e]ffect” or “material adverse change” is “any material
adverse change or effect on the business, condition (financial or otherwise), assets,
results of operations or prospects of the [c]ompany and its [s]ubsidiaries, taken as
whole.” John D. Amorosi, Significant Topics in Private Equity, in TENTH ANNUAL
PRIVATE EQUITY FORUM 2009, at 161, 166 (PLI Corp. Law Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 18,819, 2009). Most merger agreements have MAC clauses,
which allow a party to walk away from a transaction without suffering consequences
if the other party to the transaction has incurred a MAC. Robert T. Miller, The
Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC Clauses in Business
Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2007 (2009).
46
See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6 (“Bank of America
had a legal basis to abandon the deal.”). But see Hearing, supra note 40, at 5
(statement of Henry M. Paulson, U.S. Secretary of Treasury) (“I was expressing
what I am confident was the strong opinion of the Federal Reserve, namely, that
exercise of the MAC clause was not a legally viable option.”).
47
See Liz Rappaport, Lewis Testifies U.S. Urged Silence on Deal, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 23, 2009, at A1. If Bank of America’s shareholders had been informed of Merrill
Lynch’s losses, they potentially could have stopped the purchase and instead allowed
Merrill Lynch to fail. Id.
48
See id.
49
See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6.
50
Rappaport, supra note 47. Lewis testified:
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On December 22, 2008, Lewis met with the board of directors
to inform them of his decision not to invoke the MAC clause.51
According to the minutes of that meeting, Lewis listed the key
points of his discussions with Paulson and Bernanke:
(1) [F]irst and foremost, the Treasury and [Federal Reserve] are
unified in their view that the failure of [Bank of America] to
complete the acquisition of Merrill Lynch would result in
systemic risk to the financial services system in America and
would have adverse consequences for [Bank of America];
(2) second, the Treasury and [Federal Reserve] stated strongly
that were [Bank of America] to invoke the [MAC] clause in the
merger agreement with Merrill Lynch and fail to close the
transaction, the Treasury and [Federal Reserve] would remove
the Board and management of the Corporation . . . . 52

The board held another meeting on December 30, 2008, where
Lewis revealed the government’s influence over the bank:
[W]ere it not for the serious concerns regarding the status of the
United States financial services system and the adverse
consequences of that situation to [Bank of America] articulated
by the federal regulators . . . [Bank of America] would, in light
of the deterioration of the operating results and capital position
of Merrill Lynch, assert the [MAC] clause in its merger
agreement with Merrill Lynch and would seek to renegotiate
the transaction. 53

Although Bank of America’s board clearly recognized the
gravity of Merrill Lynch’s financial situation, the company did
not disclose Merrill Lynch’s significant losses or its impact on the

I can’t recall if [Paulson] said, “We would remove the board and
management if you called it [off]” or if he said “we would do it if you
intended to.” I don’t remember which one it was . . . . I said “Hank, let’s
deescalate this for a while. Let me talk to our board.”
Id. (second alteration in original). Moreover, Paulson later stated that he made this
threat regarding the board’s removal at the request of Bernanke. Cuomo Letter,
supra note 39, at 3. As Bank of America’s primary regulator, the government has the
authority to remove executives when it concludes that they are “behaving
irresponsibly.” In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6.
51
Cuomo Letter, supra note 39, at 3.
52
Minutes of Special Meeting of Board of Directors of Bank of America
Corporation 2, Dec. 22, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/ExhibitB-cuomo04232009.pdf (exhibit B to Cuomo Letter, supra note 39).
53
Minutes of Special Meeting of Board of Directors of Bank of America
Corporation 2, Dec. 30, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/ExhibitC-cuomo04232009.pdf (exhibit C to Cuomo Letter, supra note 39).
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merger. 54 Nevertheless, the final details of Bank of America’s
purchase of Merrill Lynch were completed on January 1, 2009. 55
On January 20, 2009, Bank of America announced that it
planned to accept $20 billion in TARP funds from the
government and that Merrill Lynch had lost $15.3 billion in the
fourth quarter of 2008. 56 Shareholders were furious with Bank of
America’s lack of disclosure regarding Merrill Lynch’s financial
condition, as evidenced by threats of large institutional investors,
such as TIAA-CREF 57 and CalPERS, 58 to vote against Lewis’s reelection as Chairman of the board. 59 Consequently, on April 29,
2009, Lewis was removed as Chairman of Bank of America,
although he remained the CEO and still served on the board of
directors. 60
Cuomo Letter, supra note 39, at 4.
Rappaport, supra note 47.
56
See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6; Rappaport, supra
note 47. The minutes of the board meeting held on December 30, 2008 illustrate that
Bank of America was attempting to “time its disclosure of Merrill Lynch’s losses to
coincide with the announcement of” the bank’s January earnings and its additional
receipt of TARP funds. Cuomo Letter, supra note 39, at 4.
57
TIAA-CREF is a financial services company that provides retirement
assistance to those working in the “academic, research, medical, and cultural fields.”
Overview, TIA-CREF, http://www.tiaa-cref.org/about/press/about_us/facts.html (last
visited Mar. 18, 2011). As of September 30, 2010, TIAA-CREF managed more than
$434 billion in assets and served more than 3.7 million people. Id.
58
CalPERS, or the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, provides
“retirement, health, and related financial programs and benefits to more than 1.6
million public employees, retirees, and their families and more than 3,000 public
employers” in California. CALPERS, http://www.calpers.ca.gov/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2011). The institution owns 22.7 million shares of Bank of America. See Tom
Petruno, CalPERS Joins Efforts To Oust BofA Board, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at
B2.
59
Petruno, supra note 58. CalPERS said that it would vote against the
reelection of all eighteen directors. Id. In regard to Bank of America’s failure to
disclose information to shareholders about its purchase of Merrill Lynch, the
CalPERS board president Rob Feckner stated, “[t]he entire board failed in its duties
to shareowners and should be removed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, many proxy-advisory firms, including Egan-Jones, advised
shareholders to not vote for Lewis, as well as other directors. See Press Release,
Egan-Jones Proxy Service, Egan-Jones Issues Statement on Bank of America (Apr.
24, 2009), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=conewsstory&
refer=conews&tkr=MER:US&sid=aZ7gMpmiDzxo.
60
Changing Course, ECONOMIST, May. 2, 2009, at 73. Walter Massey, a veteran
of Bank of America’s board of directors, replaced Lewis as chairman. Id. In 2008, a
proposal to split the chairman and CEO positions was approved by thirty-six percent
of stockholders’ votes because they wanted to promote the board’s independence. See
Jonathan Stempel & Martha Graybow, BofA Investor Sees Chariman/CEO Job
Split, REUTERS, Apr. 16, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/ousivMolt/
54
55
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In February 2009, Lewis testified under oath before New
York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo, stating that Paulson and
Bernanke instructed him to remain silent about the financial
situation of Merrill Lynch leading up to the merger. 61 While not
explicitly told to withhold information from shareholders, Lewis
testified that he believed the government wanted him to remain
silent, as he was instructed that “[w]e do not want a public
disclosure.” 62 In fact, when Lewis asked Bernanke to put
something down in writing, Lewis stated that Paulson
responded, “this would be a disclosable event and we do not want
a disclosable event.” 63 As a result of this exchange, nothing was
written down about the December negotiations between Lewis
and the government. 64 Moreover, Lewis has acknowledged that
he believed Paulson was asking Bank of America’s shareholders
to take some of Merrill Lynch’s losses in order to avoid
widespread financial disaster. 65 Essentially, Lewis was stating
idUSTRE53F5K120090416. The proposal was submitted again in 2009 and passed
with 50.34% supporting it and 49.66% not supporting it. Ieva M. Augstums & Mitch
Weiss, Ken Lewis Ousted as Bank of America Chairman, HUFFINGTON POST
(Apr.
29,
2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/29/bank-of-americasharehold_n_192838.html.
61
‘It Wasn’t Up to Me’: Excerpts from Ken Lewis’s Testimony, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
23, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124050112892948367.html [hereinafter It
Wasn’t Up to Me].
62
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
63
Id. By “disclosable event,” Lewis was likely trying to say that Paulson was
referring to “material” information, which the bank would have been required to
disclose. In Delaware, for information to be “material,” there must be a “substantial
likelihood” that the nonpublic information would have been a significant factor when
deciding whether to “buy, sell, vote, or tender stock.” In re Oracle Corp., 867 A.2d
904, 934 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, 872 A.2d 960 (Del. 2005) (citing Rosenblatt v. Getty
Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985)). On the federal level, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has a similar standard of disclosure for material
information. In certain situations, boards of directors must disclose material
information to stockholders. One example is Form 8-K, which the SEC requires a
corporation to file when announcing “major events that the shareholders should
know
about.”
Form
8-K,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). This
requirement is trigged in a variety of circumstances, including entry into or
termination of a material definitive agreement, material impairments of financial
information, and any other event that is not called for by Form 8-K but that the
corporation considers important to security holders. See id.
64
It Wasn’t Up to Me, supra note 61.
65
See id. In response to the question, “Wasn’t Mr. Paulson, by his instruction,
really asking Bank of America shareholders to take a good part of the hit of Merrill
losses?,” Lewis responded, “What [Paulson] was doing was trying to stem financial
disaster in the financial markets from his perspective.” Id.
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that Paulson and Bernanke forced the entire merger on him and
the board.
Curiously, after Lewis testified before Cuomo in February,
he, Bernanke, and Paulson testified in the summer of 2009 in
front of the House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform with Mr. Lewis providing conflicting stories of what
happened during the final months of 2008. 66 First, Lewis backed
off on what he initially testified to Cuomo. 67 Instead, Lewis
stated that “[he] would say they strongly advised and they spoke
in strong terms, but [that] it was with the best intentions.” 68
Lewis continued by stating that Bernanke “never said we should
not disclose something that should be disclosed.” 69 Bernanke
later denied that he threatened Lewis with taking his job if he
did not follow through with the purchase. 70 Paulson, on the other
hand, defended the government’s actions and stated that he
warned Lewis that Bank of America’s management could be
replaced if they backed out of the transaction. 71
Since the fallout from the Merrill Lynch purchase, major
shake-ups in management and the board of directors have
occurred at Bank of America. In addition to Lewis being voted
out as Chairman in spring 2009, on June 5, 2009, it was
announced that the Chief Risk Officer for Bank of America, Amy
Woods Brinkley, as well as director Robert Tillman, would be
leaving the company in the midst of a United States-mandated
66
See Michael R. Crittenden & Dan Fitzpatrick, Lewis Takes Heat but Defends
Merrill Deal, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2009, at C1.
67
See id.
68
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
69
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). He also testified:
Bank of America concluded that there were serious risks to declaring a
material adverse change, and that proceeding with the transaction, with
governmental support, was the better course . . . . [It] made sense for the
stability of the markets.
....
I believe that committed people of good intentions . . . worked desperately
hard in late 2008 to prevent a collapse of the global financial system that
would have resonated throughout the global economy.
Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn into a Federal
Bailout? Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform and Subcomm.
on Domestic Policy, 111th Cong. 24–25 (2009) (statement of Kenneth D. Lewis, Chief
Executive Officer, Bank of America).
70
See Michael R. Crittenden & Jon Hilsenrath, Bernanke Blasted in House,
WALL ST. J., June 26, 2009, at A1.
71
See Michael R. Crittenden, Paulson Lambasted for Crisis, WALL ST. J., July
17, 2009, at C1.
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review. 72 Additionally, on that same day, four outside directors
were appointed to the board of Bank of America. 73 These
directors were selected as a result of “strong suggestions” from
federal regulators that Bank of America improve its corporate
governance. 74 Furthermore, on September 30, 2009, Lewis
announced that he was resigning from his position as CEO of
Bank of America, effective at the end of 2009. 75 Lewis stated that
it was his decision to resign, and according to a company
spokesperson, he did not decide to resign due to government
pressure. 76 Shortly thereafter, Lewis agreed to return the $1
million in salary he had received for the year and not to accept
the additional $1.5 million he was to receive for the rest of the
year. 77 Bank of America said that Lewis voluntarily chose to
forgo his 2009 pay, but it was at the suggestion of the pay czar,
who felt that Lewis’s compensation package of $69.3 million was
sufficient. 78 A Bank of America spokesperson stated, “Mr.
Lewis . . . felt it was not in the best interest of Bank of America
for him to get involved in a dispute with the paymaster.” 79 In

Dan Fitzpatrick & Michael R. Crittenden, BofA’s Risk Officer Leaving Amid
Review, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2009, at C3. Brinkley, 53, had been at the company
since 1978 and once was considered a possible successor to Lewis. Id. The
spokesman for Bank of America stated her leave was “a management decision” and
that Lewis and Brinkley “mutually agreed that a change be made to better deal with
the credit environment as it is evolving.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
73
Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, BofA Gets New Blood for Board, WALL ST.
J., June 6, 2009, at B1.
74
Id. Two of the new board members have ties to the government: Susan Bies is
a former Federal Reserve Governor and Donald Powell is a former FDIC Chairman.
Id.
75
See Dan Fitzpatrick & Joann S. Lublin, Bank of America Chief Resigns Under
Fire, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2009, at A1.
76
See id. Lewis wrote to employees, “I will simply say that this was my decision,
and mine alone.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
77
Deborah Solomon & Dan Fitzpatrick, Czar Blocks BofA Chief’s Pay, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 16, 2009, at A1 [hereinafter Czar Blocks BofA Chief’s Pay]. However, Lewis
did keep his pension fund, worth $53 million and consisting of $3.5 million a year in
payouts, for the rest of his life. Colin Barr, BofA CEO: $53 Million Retirement Score,
CNNMONEY.COM (Oct. 1, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/01/news/newsmakers/
lewis.payout.fortune/index.htm.
78
See Czar Blocks BofA Chief’s Pay, supra note 77. The pay czar, Kenneth
Feinberg, is the United States Treasury Department’s “special master” regarding
compensation. Id.
79
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
72
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December 2009, Brian T. Moynihan, then in charge of the
consumer banking division of Bank of America, was named the
new CEO of the company. 80
Furthermore, on July 16, 2009, The Wall Street Journal
reported that Bank of America was operating under a secret
memorandum of understanding (“MOU”), 81 which was imposed in
May by the government. 82 The agreement required Bank of
America to “overhaul its board” and tackle problems associated
with risk and liquidity management. 83
By the end of summer 2009, Bank of America began to
experience legal trouble, in addition to strong criticism from the
press and public, regarding its acquisition of Merrill Lynch and
its lack of disclosures to shareholders. First, the SEC alleged
that proxy documents sent to Bank of America’s shareholders at
the end of 2008 stated that Merrill Lynch would not pay year-end
bonuses or compensation before the purchase was finalized
without permission from Bank of America. 84 However, Merrill
Lynch employees received $3.6 billion in bonuses shortly before
Bank of America officially purchased the company. 85 Due to the
size of the bonuses and the poor financial health of Merrill
Lynch, the SEC alleged this omission was material and that
Mildenberg, supra note 37.
An MOU is the most common informal enforcement proceeding federal
regulators implement against banks. James M. Rockett, Confronting a Regulatory
Crisis: A View from the Trenches During Troubled Times, 126 BANKING L.J. 307, 311
(2009). Regulators use this document to inform banks of corrective actions they must
take within a specified time period. Id. An MOU is used when the weakness
regulators see within the institution is not considered to be an immediate threat to
the bank’s health. Id. It is not a public document, and thus the general public cannot
review its terms on the bank’s or regulatory institution’s websites. Id. Accordingly,
the nonpublic MOU has been called the “weakest type of enforcement action.”
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce,
39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1619 (2007). In the past, regulators chose to issue them
because they feared public disclosure of a bank with an MOU would result in a
“ ‘crisis of [public] confidence’ in the banking system.” Id. (alteration in original); see
also Paul L. Lee, Risk Management and the Role of the Board of Directors:
Regulatory Expectations and Shareholder Actions, 125 BANKING L.J. 679, 695–96
(2008).
82
Dan Fitzpatrick, U.S. Regulators to BofA: Obey or Else, WALL ST. J., July 16,
2009, at C1 [hereinafter U.S. Regulators to BofA]. An MOU is the “most serious
procedural action taken against Bank of America by federal regulators since the
financial crisis erupted.” Id.
83
Id.
84
See BofA Hit by Fine over Merrill, supra note 14.
85
Kara Scannell et al., Judge Tosses out Bonus Deal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
2009, at A1.
80
81
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investors should have known about the bonuses at the time of the
December vote. 86 The SEC filed suit, but in August 2009, it was
announced that Bank of America and the SEC had reached a $33
million deal to settle the lawsuit, with Bank of America neither
However, in
admitting nor denying any wrongdoing. 87
September 2009, United States District Court Judge Jed Rakoff
dismissed the deal, pointing out that it was the shareholders that
were being asked to pay the fine for the alleged wrongdoing,
despite also being the victims. 88 In January 2010, the SEC
expanded its lawsuit against Bank of America by filing charges
against the corporation for withholding information from
shareholders about Merrill Lynch’s financial losses after they
In February 2010, Judge Rakoff
approved the merger. 89
unhappily approved a $150 million settlement between the SEC
and Bank of America. 90 Indeed, Judge Rakoff stated that what
Bank of America did “in effect if not in intent” amounted to “a
fraud.” 91
Moreover, five pension funds have sued Bank of America
over the allegations that the company withheld Merrill Lynch’s
losses from shareholders before they voted in December 2008.92
The pension funds are from Ohio, Texas, Sweden, and the
Netherlands, and had previously filed suits independently of one
another but later joined their suits at the end of September

BofA Hit by Fine over Merrill, supra note 14.
Id.
88
See Scannell et al., supra note 85. Judge Rakoff said that imposing the fine,
which ultimately would hurt shareholders, “does not comport with the most
elementary notions of justice and morality,” and that if the bank’s executives relied
on attorneys when creating the proxy statements, “why are the penalties not then
sought from the lawyers?” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
89
See Zachary A. Goldfarb, Regulator Broadens Charges on Bank of America for
Crisis Moves, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2010, at A13.
90
Rakoff Backs BofA Accord, supra note 15. Bank of America agreed to a long
list of new policies in the agreement, including allowing shareholders a voice on pay
vote and creating a “super-independence” standard for compensation committee
members. Kristin Gribben, BofA Agrees to Governance Changes in SEC Settlement,
AGENDA, Feb. 8, 2010. Judge Rakoff grudgingly accepted the settlement, stating that
the fine was “paltry,” and “hid[ ] material information from its shareholders.” Rakoff
Backs BofA Accord, supra note 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). He accused
the SEC of being “content with modest and misdirected sanctions.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
91
Rakoff Backs BofA Accord, supra note 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92
Marshall Eckblad, BofA Sued by Funds over Merrill, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29,
2009, at C3.
86
87
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2009. 93 Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray, the lead
plaintiff in the case, plans to seek damages not only from the
corporation, but also from individual executives and directors. 94
Although the SEC settled its lawsuits against Bank of
America, 95 it declined to file individual charges against the
individual executives and lawyers who approved the decisions
concerning the transactions. 96 While bank officials were lucky
not to be charged individually by the SEC, two management
officials, as well as the bank itself, did indeed face civil charges
from Cuomo on February 4, 2010. 97 In the State of New York
Cuomo charged Lewis and Price, the finance chief when Bank of
America bought Merrill Lynch and the current consumerbanking chief, with misleading investors by not disclosing Merrill
Lynch’s losses before the shareholders voted affirmatively to buy
the company. 98 Specifically, Cuomo argues that Bank of America
and its two top management executives, Lewis and Price,
engaged in a concerted effort to deceive shareholders and the
board of directors. 99
Id.
Id. One document filed in March 2009 detailed losses of hundreds of millions
of dollars; however, the plaintiffs in the case had not formally stated the amount of
damages they were requesting. See id.
95
See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
96
See Rakoff Backs BofA Accord, supra note 15. In order to sue individuals for
fraud, the SEC must prove that such individuals sought to mislead investors. See
Dan Fitzpatrick & Kara Scannell, Ex-BofA Chief Sued for Fraud, WALL ST. J., Feb.
5, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter Ex-BofA Chief Sued for Fraud]. The SEC has stated that
it did not find any evidence that “executives deliberately concealed information from
lawyers or that internal or outside lawyers intentionally sought to mislead
shareholders.” Id.
97
See Ex-BofA Chief Sued for Fraud, supra note 96.
98
See id. Cuomo brought the charges under the Martin Act, a New York law
that does not require a finding that one acted intentionally in securities fraud. See
id.; see also N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352–53 (McKinney 2010). During a telephone
press conference, Cuomo stated, “We believe the bank management understated the
Merrill Lynch losses to shareholders, then they overstated their ability to terminate
their agreement to secure $20 billion of TARP money, and that is just a fraud.”
Karen Freifeld & David Scheer, Ken Lewis, Bank of America Sued by Cuomo for
Fraud over Merrill, BLOOMBERG.COM (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=avbhw22ygkMA (internal quotation marks
omitted).
99
See Press Release, Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney Gen., New York, Attorney
General Cuomo Files Fraud Charges Against Bank of America, Former CEO
Kenneth Lewis, and Former CFO Joseph Price (Feb. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2010/feb/ feb04a_10.html. Cuomo’s complaint
states that “[m]any of the statements made by Lewis and Price in the period from
the merger’s announcement to its closing were false, misleading, or became so in
93
94
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These events raise questions and invoke dialogue regarding
the business judgment rule, the duty of candor, Rule 10b-5, and
golden shares.
B. General Motors and Its Majority Shareholder, the United
States Government
Until 2008, General Motors (“GM”) was the world’s largest
auto manufacturer, producing over nine million cars and trucks a
year in thirty-four different countries. 100 The company had 463
subsidiaries and employed 234,500 people—91,000 in America
alone—paying $476 million in salaries each month. 101 Moreover,
GM provided health care and pension benefits for 493,000 retired
workers and spent $50 billion each year buying parts and
services from 11,500 vendors. 102 However, the company had not
made a profit since 2004, and on June 1, 2009, it became one of
In its
the largest industrial bankruptcies in history. 103
bankruptcy filing, GM declared that it had $172 billion in debt
with only $82 billion in assets. 104 The filing came after President
Obama, on March 30, 2009, “laid out a framework for [GM] to
achieve viability that required the [c]ompany to rework its
business plan, accelerate its operational restructuring and make
far greater reductions in its outstanding liabilities.” 105 After
approving GM’s plan, the government agreed to provide
approximately $30 billion, in addition to the $20 billion the
government had already provided, to support GM’s restructuring
plan. 106
light of the events” that occurred over fall 2008. Complaint at 70, New York v. Bank
of Am. Corp., 2010 WL 430118 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010) (No. 4501152010),
available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2010/feb/BoA_Complaint.pdf. Those
statements include making misleading statements about due diligence, misleading
the market, supporting the merger despite growing losses at Merrill Lynch, issuing
a misleading proxy statement, supporting the merger at the shareholder vote, and
issuing a press release on January 1, 2009 to announce the merger without
disclosing all of the events that had occurred over the previous few months. See id.
at 70–80.
100
A Giant Falls, ECONOMIST, June 6, 2009, at 1.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
King & Terlep, supra note 21.
104
See A Giant Falls, supra note 100.
105
Fact Sheet on Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative for
General Motors, supra note 24.
106
See id. The government had already put approximately $20 billion into GM
at the time of the bankruptcy filing, leading the total cost to taxpayers to be around
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The government wasted no time in reshaping GM’s board of
directors in the hope of creating the “New G.M.” 107 On June 9,
2009, Edward E. Whitacre Jr., the former Chairman of AT&T,
was handpicked by the government’s auto task force and named
the new Chairman of GM. 108 Whitacre replaced GM’s longtime
Chairman and Chief Executive Richard Wagoner, who resigned
in March 2009 upon the request of President Obama. 109 While
five existing directors remained on the board, 110 six other board
members retired in accordance with the government’s
restructuring plan. 111 To replace these resigned directors, the
United States government, who has taken a sixty percent stake
in the company, stated that it would name four more directors to
serve on the board. 112 Furthermore, the Canadian government,
who would own twelve percent of the company after giving $9

$100 billion. See A Giant Falls, supra note 100, at 3. GM had received the initial
loan from the government as part of its auto industry bailout. See Stoll & King,
supra note 6.
107
Edward E. Whitacre Jr., N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/
reference/timestopics/people/w/edward_e_whitacre_jr/index.html?inline=nyt-per.
(last updated Aug. 12, 2010).
108
See Bill Vlasic, G.M. Chairman’s Task: Bring Fresh Perspective, N.Y. TIMES,
June 10, 2009, at B4. In February 2009, President Obama assembled the auto task
force to restructure the nation’s auto industry by analyzing the various corporations
and by making recommendations to auto companies on how to survive. See Neil King
Jr. & John D. Stoll, Auto Task Force Set To Back More Loans, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26,
2009, at A1. The head of the team, who has taken a “crash course” with the whole
team in the workings of the auto industry, reports to the Treasury Secretary and the
Chief White House Economic Adviser. Id. Known as the Presidential Task Force on
the Auto Industry, it is comprised of ten cabinet members and other top officials, but
also includes many senior policy aids. David Shepardson & Gordon Trowbridge, Auto
Task Force Taking Shape, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 21, 2009, at B1. The appointment of
Whitacre reflected the President’s top auto advisers’ belief that an outsider was
needed to lead GM in the right direction. See Edward E. Whitacre Jr., supra note
107.
109
See Vlasic, supra note 108; Micheline Maynard, G. Richard Wagoner Jr., N.Y.
TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/w/g_richard_
wagoner_jr/index.html?inline=nyt-per (last updated Mar. 30, 2009). In a statement
following his resignation, Wagoner stated that he had been “urged to ‘step aside’ ” by
government officials. Id.
110
Initially, six existing directors remained on the board. See Vlasic, supra note
108. However, on December 1, 2009, GM announced that Frederick A. Henderson,
the company’s CEO, was resigning and would be succeeded by Whitacre. See
Frederick A. Henderson, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/people/h/frederick_a_henderson/index.html?inline=nyt-per (last updated
Dec. 1, 2009).
111
See Vlasic, supra note 108.
112
See Stoll & King, supra note 6.
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billion in aid, would name one director to the board. 113 Lastly,
the United Automobile Workers (“UAW”) health care trust,
“which own[ed] 17.5% of [the company], ha[d] already named its
representative to the board.” 114 The new government-assembled
board of directors planned to work with management during the
end of 2009 to revamp GM’s business strategy for 2010. 115 On
July 10, 2009, GM emerged from bankruptcy after only forty days
in court and a $50 billion commitment from the government. 116
The government has stated that it is a reluctant shareholder
in GM and would not become overly involved in the
White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs
corporation. 117
stated, “There obviously is a balancing act . . . . While not
running an auto company on a day-to-day basis, obviously there
will be concern about investments by the taxpayer, as there
should be.” 118 Accordingly, the government has outlined four
principles that will apply to its equity stake in GM:
The government has no desire to own equity stakes in
companies any longer than necessary, and will seek to dispose
of its ownership interests as soon as practicable. . . .
In exceptional cases where the U.S. government feels it is
necessary to respond to a company’s request for substantial
assistance, the government will reserve the right to set upfront
conditions to protect taxpayers, promote financial stability and
encourage growth. . . .

See id.
Id. Bondholders and other creditors will receive the remaining ten percent
stake in the company. See John Hughes et al., GM Begins Bankruptcy Process with
Filing for Affiliate, BLOOMBERG.COM (June 1, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20601110&sid=ahXd19xtoPx0.
115
See John D. Stoll, GM Board To Help Update Strategy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9,
2009, at B1.
116
See Stoll & King, supra note 6.
117
See King & Terlep, supra note 21. President Obama emphasized that they
were “acting as a reluctant shareholder because this is the only way to help GM
succeed.” Eamon Javers, Obama: ‘Reluctant Shareholder’ in GM, POLITCO.COM
(June 1, 2009), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/23165.html (internal
quotation marks omitted). President Obama said the goal was to “get GM back on its
feet, take a hands off approach and get out quickly.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). As a shareholder, government officials promised to only vote on “core
governance issues,” including the selection of the board of directors and significant
corporate events and transactions. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
118
Neil King Jr. et al., The GM Bankruptcy: Potential Conflicts Abound in
Government Role, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2009, at A14 [hereinafter The GM
Bankruptcy] (internal quotation marks omitted).
113
114
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After any up-front conditions are in place, the government
will protect the taxpayers’ investment by managing its
ownership stake in a hands-off, commercial manner. . . .
As a common shareholder, the government will vote on core
governance issues, including the selection of a company’s board
of directors and major corporate events or transactions. 119

The government has insisted that it will not be involved in the
day-to-day affairs, stating that it will only help pick GM’s first
set of board members, remaining uninvolved after this action is
complete. 120 In fact, the Treasury Department plans to hold its
shares of GM in a blind trust. 121
GM’s government-assisted bankruptcy raises the issue of
what duties the government owes other shareholders when it
serves as both the majority shareholder and the governmental
regulator. This issue differs from the situation at Bank of
America where the government was allegedly pressuring the
board of directors to take certain actions. 122
C. Citigroup and Its Controlling Shareholder, the United States
Government
Citigroup, a financial services corporation that had served as
an aggressive player in the securitized mortgage market before
the housing bust, first received $25 billion in TARP funds in
October 2008. 123 The company then received a second lifeline
from the government in December in the form of $20 billion,
119
Fact Sheet on Obama Administration Auto Restructuring Initiative for
General Motors, supra note 24. In its press release, the government does not provide
specifics as to what it means by managing in a “hands-off” manner and what
“upfront-conditions” might be required. Id. It is interesting to note that the
government does not mention its duty to other GM shareholders. As the majority
shareholder, they owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders. See infra Part IV.C.
120
See The GM Bankruptcy, supra note 118.
121
Id. Blind trusts are utilized to manage assets like traditional trusts, except
that in blind trusts, the beneficiary is unable to watch over the trustee and is, in
essence, “blind.” See Megan J. Ballard, The Shortsightedness of Blind Trusts, 56 U.
KAN. L. REV. 43, 58 (2007). The trustee does not tell the beneficiary about the
identity and management of the trust property. Id.
122
See supra Part I.A.
123
See Citigroup Inc., N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/
companies/citigroup_inc/index.html (last updated Dec. 7, 2010); In Merrill Deal, U.S.
Played Hardball, supra note 6. Citigroup received these funds on October 28, 2008
through the sale of preferred stock and warrants to the Treasury Department under
TARP’s Capital Purchase Program. See Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K),
at 7 (Feb. 26, 2010); TRANSACTIONS REPORT, CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM, supra
note 34.
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resulting in a total of $45 billion in government loans. 124
Citigroup received these additional funds from the government
after its stock fell sixty percent to a sixteen-year low in
November 2008. 125 To boost its capital reserves, and thus signal
its future ability to absorb losses, Citigroup announced in
February 2009 a plan to offer investors the option of exchanging
a significant portion of preferred stock into common stock. 126
However, Citigroup received a setback in May 2009 when the
government, after conducting an in-depth analysis to evaluate
the bank’s “ability to withstand future losses,” decided that
Citigroup still needed to raise an additional $5 billion to stay
afloat. 127 In response, Citigroup announced that it would expand
its previously disclosed public exchange offers to investors to
convert an extra $5.5 billion of its preferred shares into common
stock, resulting in an overall total of $58 billion of preferred stock
to be exchanged for common stock, assuming full participation by

124
See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6. Once again, this
loan was received through the sale of preferred stock and warrants to the Treasury
Department. Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Feb. 26, 2010).
125
See David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees To Rescue Struggling Citigroup, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 24, 2008, at A1. At the time, Citigroup had “more than 200 million
customer accounts in 106 countries,” and thus a sharp drop in stock price would
inevitably scare customers and hurt the bank. Id.
126
See Citigroup Opens Its Share Offer, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2009, at C3.
Specifically, Citigroup initially expected to convert $58 billion worth of preferred
stock and trust securities held by the government and private investors into common
stock. See id.; Citi Sets Plan To Convert $58 Billion in Stock, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/06/10/citi-sets-plan-to-convert-58-billion-instock/. Preferred shareholders’ rights are spelled out in a corporation’s articles of
incorporation, and thus they are contractual in nature. See In re Appraisal of
Metromedia Int’l Group, Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 899 (Del. Ch. 2009), modified, No. 3341CC, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2009), aff’d, 985 A.2d 389 (Del. 2009).
By taking the preferred shares, which the government acquired through the loans
they provided to the banks, and converting them into common shares, the
government does not provide any additional money but the bank gains additional
capital. See Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. May Convert Banks’ Bailouts to Equity Share,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/20/business/20
bailout.html.
127
See Deborah Solomon et al., Banks Need at Least $65 Billion in Capital,
WALL ST. J., May 7, 2009, at A1. In spring 2009, the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury Department conducted a two-and-a-half month analysis, or “stress test,” of
the nineteen largest financial institutions in America to assess their financial health
and their ability to absorb losses. Id. While six banks were not required to raise any
additional funds, other banks, including Citigroup, were told they needed to raise
capital in order to survive. See id. Other institutions that needed additional capital
included Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Morgan Stanley. See id.
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investors. 128 On June 10, 2009, Citigroup publicly announced
that the government had approved the conversion plan and had
agreed to convert $25 billion of its $45 billion preferred
investment in the bank into approximately 7.7 billion shares of
common stock. 129 Finally, on July 30, 2009, the transaction was
completed and resulted in the government holding a thirty-four
percent equity stake in the company. 130
In mid-September 2009, Citigroup executives began
exploring options for reducing the government’s thirty-four
percent ownership of the corporation, including issuing new
shares to the public and having the Treasury Department sell
part of its stake in Citigroup. 131 On December 23, 2009,
Citigroup repaid the $20 billion in TARP preferred securities
held by the Treasury Department, enabling the company to raise
approximately $20.3 billion in common equity. 132 As of December
31, 2009, the Treasury Department continued to hold
approximately 7.7 billion shares―approximately twenty-seven
percent―of Citigroup’s common stock, and the Treasury
Department and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) continued to hold approximately $5.3 billion of the
Nevertheless, on
company’s trust-preferred securities. 133
January 19, 2010, Citigroup reported a $7.6 billion loss for the
fourth quarter of 2009, 134 causing officials of the Treasury
Department to delay any plans to release the company from the
128
See Citigroup Opens Its Share Offer, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2009, at C3.
Regarding the plan, CEO Vikram Pandit said, “Citi[group] will be among the best
capitalized banks in the world.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
129
See Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Feb. 26, 2010);
Citigroup, Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 19 (Feb. 26, 2010);
David Enrich & Deborah Solomon, Citigroup Explores Bid To Pare U.S. Stake, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 15, 2009, at C1; Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Citi Announces Public
Share Exchange Launch, Finalizes Definitive Agreement with U.S. Government
(June 10, 2009), available at http://www.citibank.com/citi/press/2009/090610a.htm.
130
See Ellis, supra note 6. According to Robert Thomson, the Editor-in-Chief of
Dow Jones, this large government stake is one of the many reasons Citigroup was
removed from the Dow Jones Industrial Average on June 8, 2009. See E.S.
Browning, Travelers, Cisco Replace Citi, GM in Dow, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2009, at
C1.
131
See Enrich & Solomon, supra note 129.
132
See Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Feb. 26, 2010).
133
Id. at 6, 8.
134
Citigroup Inc., supra note 123. Citigroup announced a total loss for 2009 of
$1.6 billion. Id. Moreover, the fourth quarter loss was attributed to a “$10.1 billion
accounting charge tied to the repayment of [the company’s] bailout money.” Id. Such
losses highlight the general concern over Citigroup’s financial condition. See id.
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government’s control. 135 The report represented a “significant
setback” for the company and its efforts to reclaim its
independence. 136
In addition to providing funds to Citigroup, the government
made substantial efforts to influence the company’s
management. Specifically, the FDIC137 pressured Citigroup to
replace some of its management because government officials
were frustrated with the “company’s pace of change” and were
especially concerned about the lack of commercial banking
experience among the senior executives. 138 Accordingly, federal
officials contacted Jerry Grundhofer, who had recently joined
Citigroup’s board and served as the former U.S. Bancorp CEO, to
address this perceived lack in leadership. 139 Because the bank
was so heavily dependent upon government aid, many believed
that the FDIC would be successful in its efforts to exert influence
over the company. 140

See Eric Dash, U.S. Is Said To Rethink Quick Sale of Citi Stake, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2009, at B1.
136
Citigroup Inc., supra note 123. However, in March 2010, Herbert Allison, who
oversees the government’s financial rescue plan, stated before Congress that the
government had no plans to buy more interest in Citigroup and that it intends to
“rapidly” rid itself of its investment in the corporation over the next year. See
Michael R. Crittenden & Matthias Rieker, Clash over ‘Too Big To Fail’, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 5, 2010, at C3.
137
The FDIC is an independent agency “funded [solely] by premiums that banks
and thrift institutions pay for deposit insurance coverage and from earnings on
investments in U.S. Treasury securities.” Who Is the FDIC?, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/index.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2011). The FDIC examines and supervises approximately 4,900 financial institutions
by “monitoring and addressing risks” in order to protect insured depositors. Id.
138
Damian Paletta & David Enrich, FDIC Pushes Purge at Citi, WALL ST. J.,
June 5, 2009, at A1. For example, CEO Vikram Pandit has an investment banking
background while the majority of Citigroup’s problems are in the consumer loans
area. Id.
139
Id. In addition to Grundhofer, who was appointed in March, Citigroup
appointed three more board members in July, all of whom have experience with
changing distressed financial institutions and understanding regulatory issues.
Robin Sidel, Citi Taps Directors with Fix-It Expertise, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2009, at
B1. The new directors are Diana Taylor, who served as New York State Banking
Department Superintendent; Timothy Collins, “who helped turn around a failing
Japanese bank”; and Robert Joss, who restructured an Australian bank. Id.
140
See Paletta & Enrich, supra note 138. In addition to TARP funds, the FDIC is
currently helping Citigroup finance a roughly $300 billion loss-sharing agreement,
and Citigroup has already issued around $40 billion in FDIC-backed debt since
December 2008. Id.
135
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FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair appeared to be utilizing her
influence when she pressed another regulator to lower the
government’s confidential ranking of Citigroup’s health, which
would allow regulators to even further control the company. 141
As of the writing of this Article, Citigroup officials believed that
the FDIC would place Citigroup on its “problem” list of banks if
the company did not remove CEO Vikram Pandit and other
executives. 142 According to The Wall Street Journal, Citigroup’s
removal of CFO Edward Kelly served as an attempt to appease
federal regulators. 143 In fact, Citigroup Chairman Richard
Parsons had been trying to defuse a “standoff between the
company and [certain] federal officials,” leading Pandit to
reluctantly remove Kelly under pressure from both Parsons and
federal officials. 144
In October 2009, a government-ordered outside review of
Conducted by
Citigroup’s management was released. 145
146
the review
consulting firm Egon Zehnder International,

See id. Apparently, Bair has become more willing to challenge her peers than
in the past, and thus, the FDIC is gaining significant influence in the financial
world. See id. Bair predicted the housing crisis before many of her equals did, and
the FDIC has played a pivotal role in dealing with the current financial crisis. Id.
Thus, Bair and the FDIC have been able to exert more influence and pressure on
Citigroup than they have exerted on financial institutions in the past. See id.
142
Id. Being placed on the problem list could limit Citigroup’s access to federal
aid and cause trading partners and clients to take their business elsewhere. Id.
Because the FDIC’s problem list is confidential, it is unknown if Citigroup has been
added to the list. Id.
143
See David Enrich & Robin Sidel, Citigroup Shakes up Leaders To Pacify U.S.,
WALL ST. J., July 10, 2009, at A1. Kelly, whose qualifications had been questioned
by some federal regulators, had only been CFO from March 2009 to the beginning of
July 2009. See id. He is now a vice chairman and advisor to Pandit. See id.
144
Id. In June, Kelly “referred to the [FDIC] as ‘our tertiary regulator,’ behind
the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,” a statement
that was not well received by the FDIC and further intensified the feud between the
two. Id. Kelly, before leaving the company, stated, “Regulators are making it
impossible for me to do my job . . . . I’m becoming a hindrance to the company.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
145
See David Enrich & Joann S. Lublin, Good Marks, Mostly, for Citi
Management, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2009, at C1 [hereinafter Good Marks, Mostly, for
Citi]. The review occurred after the government’s spring 2009 stress tests. See id.
Companies that needed more capital had to review their management and then
notify federal regulators of their results. Id.
146
Id. According to The Wall Street Journal, the FDIC required Citigroup to
utilize an outside firm to review its management. Id. In fact, the FDIC initially
rejected Citigroup’s first-choice firm to conduct the review, leading the FDIC to send
Citigroup a list of firms the company would be allowed to use. David Enrich &
141
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awarded mostly high marks to Citigroup’s management, with
Pandit being reviewed favorably and only a few senior
management positions receiving negative reviews. 147 However,
shortly after the review was released, FDIC officials were
skeptical about the validity and strength of the report. 148 As a
result, the FDIC may not rely heavily on the report during its
next regulatory review of Citigroup’s management, which could
have a negative effect on the FDIC’s rating of the company. 149
Due to the large ownership stake the government now has in
Citigroup, it is arguably a controlling shareholder in the
corporation. 150 Accordingly, the recent events occurring between
Citigroup and the government raise many questions regarding
the fiduciary duties the government owes other Citigroup
shareholders. Similar to GM’s situation, the government must
simultaneously act as the governmental regulator of Citigroup
and own a significant portion of the corporation.
II. THE TRADITIONAL TRIAD OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED BY,
AND THE LEGAL PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE TO, BOARDS OF
DIRECTORS RELEVANT TO ANALYZING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF
2008
Since boards of directors consist usually of a relatively small
number of individuals making important decisions on behalf of
many people―the shareholders―they are vulnerable to criticism
and lawsuits. Fortunately, the law provides various forms of
protection to ensure that directors do not fear costly litigation
every time they make a decision for the corporation and its
These protections include the business
shareholders. 151
Randall Smith, Review of Citi Draws Wary FDIC Response, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9,
2009, at C1 [hereinafter Review of Citi Draws Wary FDIC Response].
147
See Good Marks, Mostly, for Citi, supra note 145. Two directors that did not
receive favorable reviews were Vice Chairman Lewis Kaden and Chief
Administrative Officer Don Callahan. See id.
148
See Review of Citi Draws Wary FDIC Response, supra note 146. Part of the
review utilized interviews with Citigroup executives regarding their opinion of the
effectiveness of their co-workers. See id.
149
See id. The ratings, which are determined in part by a review of a bank’s
management, are a factor in whether a bank is subject to tight regulatory control,
which Citigroup is currently under. See id.
150
See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of controlling shareholders.
151
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON ET AL., BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: LEGAL STRUCTURES,
GOVERNANCE, AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 591–92 (2009)
(discussing the various means of protection provided to corporate directors and
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judgment rule, the board’s ability to place exculpatory provisions
in the articles of incorporation, and the simple fact that
shareholder derivative litigation is rarely successful.
A.

The Business Judgment Rule152

Shareholders may technically own a corporation, but
directors are given broad authority over how to run the
If
corporation in jurisdictions all over the country. 153
shareholders are unhappy, they certainly have the right to sue
directors for breach of fiduciary duty in a shareholder derivative
action; however, directors are generally protected by the business
judgment rule. 154 The business judgment rule is the backbone of
American corporate law and is frequently addressed in American

officers, including exculpatory provisions and the business judgment rule). Also,
Branson discusses how indemnification in the form of reimbursing directors and/or
officers for litigation costs and liability and director and officer insurance protect
directors; however, these two forms of protection are beyond the scope of this Article
and will not be discussed. Id. Additionally, Branson discusses the difficulty of
bringing a shareholder derivative suit and the decrease in the number of such suits
filed since the 1980s due to special litigation committees’ ability to halt these types
of lawsuits. Id. at 467–68.
152
This Article will discuss only those provisions of the business judgment rule
relevant to the analysis of Bank of America, Citigroup, and GM.
153
See 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1036 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002). Indeed, section
141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which is important not only
because most public companies incorporate in Delaware but also because most states
look to Delaware for guidance in shaping their own corporate laws, states that the
“business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010).
154
FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 153. If shareholders wish to sue the board of
directors, they must first demand the board of directors to sue on behalf of the
corporation. If the board refuses such demand, the court applies the business
judgment rule in reviewing the board’s refusal to act pursuant to the shareholders’
demand. Id. However, if the shareholders can state reasons with particularity that
the demand on the board should be excused as futile, the shareholders retain the
ability to initiate the derivative action. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808, 818
(Del. 1984) (holding that the shareholders “failed to allege facts with particularity
indicating that the [corporation’s] directors were tainted by interest, lacked
independence, or took action contrary to [the corporation’s] best interests,” thereby
negating any doubt as to the applicability of the business judgment rule). In
determining demand futility, the court “must decide whether, under the
particularized facts alleged [by the shareholders], a reasonable doubt is created that:
(1) the directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged
transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of [the board’s] business
judgment.” Id. at 814. See infra Part II.C for a further discussion of shareholder
derivative litigation.
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courtrooms. 155 Created approximately two centuries ago, the
business judgment rule has been continuously developing
through American common law. 156 Today, the business judgment
rule is almost exclusively an American concept. 157 Despite the
fact that the business judgment rule is consistently applied in
courtrooms and analyzed by scholars, many consider it to be “one
of the least understood concepts in the entire corporate field.” 158
The business judgment rule can best be defined as “a
presumption that[,] in making a business decision[,] the directors
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests
of the company.” 159 In Delaware, 160 a shareholder plaintiff must
prove that the directors of a corporation “breached . . . one of the
triads of their fiduciary duty—good faith, loyalty[,] or due care”—
in order to overcome the presumption of the business judgment

155
See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment
Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 453 (2005); E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the
New Corporate Culture, 59 BUS. LAW. 1447, 1454 (2004).
156
See Ann M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing Authority and
Accountability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 39, 58 (2008)
(citing S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
93, 93 (1979)). The business judgment rule has remained uncodified. Douglas M.
Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L.
REV. 631, 633 (2002).
157
Branson, supra note 156, at 633. However, in 1999, Australia enacted a new
law based on the American construction of the business judgment rule. Id.
158
Johnson, supra note 155 (quoting Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 270 (1967) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
159
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. This definition is the most quoted definition of the
business judgment rule in Delaware courts. Branson, supra note 156, at 635 n.16.
Other definitions include the American Law Institute (“ALI”) version of the business
judgment rule, which has been adopted by several states. Id. at 634. The ALI version
is as follows:
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills
the [duty of care] if the director or officer: (1) is not interested in the subject
of the business judgment; (2) is informed with respect to the subject of the
business judgment to the extent the director or officer reasonably believes
to be appropriate under the circumstances; and (3) rationally believes that
the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (1994) (citation omitted).
160
Delaware is the leader in American corporate law and is thus the best place
to consult when analyzing the developments and current status of corporate law,
including the business judgment rule. See Scarlett, supra note 156, at 59.
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rule. 161 If a plaintiff overcomes that presumption, the burden
shifts to the directors, who then have the opportunity to prove
their case and free themselves from liability. 162 Thus, decisions
made by directors will not be reversed by courts unless the
following circumstances can be proven:
the directors are interested or lack independence relative to the
decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be
attributed to a rational business purpose[,] or reach their
decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure
to consider all material facts reasonably available. 163

Through this presumption, the board of directors’ business
decisions are protected from being second-guessed by judges in a
courtroom so long as the decisions are “made in good faith and in
the exercise of due care.” 164 Thus, the business judgment rule
acts as a standard of review for analyzing the decisions made by
boards of directors in order to determine liability, 165 with
directors only needing to demonstrate “some (slight) care and
only a rational (plausible) basis for the decision made.”166
Additionally, the business judgment rule helps promote the full
exercise of managerial power, so that the directors, and not the
shareholders, make the decisions and control the affairs of a
corporation. 167

161
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993). The business
judgment rule will not apply if the directors committed an act of fraud, illegality, or
waste. See Scarlett, supra note 156, at 59–60. Moreover, the duty of good faith is not
always considered a stand-alone duty, but is instead viewed as a sub-category of the
duty of loyalty. See infra notes 181–88 and accompanying text.
162
See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (stating that “[i]f the [business judgment]
rule is rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant directors, the proponents of the
challenged transaction, to prove to the trier of fact the ‘entire fairness’ of the
transaction to the shareholder plaintiff” (quoting Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366,
1376 (Del. 1993))); see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,
1279 (Del. 1989); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); FLETCHER
ET AL., supra note 153.
163
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000).
164
Veasey, supra note 155, at 1454.
165
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 87 (2004). In his article, Bainbridge argues that the business
judgment rule often acts more like an abstention doctrine as courts “refrain from
reviewing board decisions unless exacting preconditions for review are satisfied.” Id.
166
Branson, supra note 156, at 635.
167
Janet E. Kerr, Developments in Corporate Governance: The Duty of Good
Faith and Its Impact on Director Conduct, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1037, 1074
(2006).
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No clear-cut answer exists as to why the business judgment
rule was developed, 168 but several theories have been
promulgated. One of the primary justifications for the business
judgment rule is that “judges are not business experts.” 169
Indeed, the Delaware Court of Chancery has stated that
“[b]ecause businessmen and women are correctly perceived as
possessing skills, information and judgment not possessed by
reviewing courts . . . courts have long been reluctant to secondguess such decisions when they appear to have been made in
good faith.” 170 Thus, the business judgment rule encourages
directors to take risks without fear of being held liable for their
decisions, promoting the view that directors should not be held
liable for actions that in hindsight are not ideal. 171 Moreover,
because the law and the marketplace value the board of directors’
authority, the business judgment rule provides protection from
judicial encroachment. 172 Furthermore, the business judgment
rule prevents stockholders from asserting and forcing their
demands, which may not be in the best interest of the majority of
shareholders, upon directors. 173 Lastly, the business judgment
rule recognizes that shareholders “voluntarily undertake the risk
of a business judgment,” but always retain the power to vote
directors out of office. 174
The first of the three triads of the business judgment rule is
the duty of due care. The duty of due care “places an affirmative
obligation on the directors to protect the interests of the
corporation and its shareholders when making decisions on
behalf of the corporation.” 175 As a result, “directors must
critically assess relevant information before making a
168
See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000
WIS. L. REV. 573, 573 (stating, “thousands of pages of corporate law scholarship and
commentary have been devoted to these fundamental questions, yet we remain short
of any broad consensus as to the answers”).
169
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
170
In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988).
171
See Johnson, supra note 155, at 455–56.
172
See Bainbridge, supra note 165, at 108.
173
Kerr, supra note 167, at 1074–75.
174
Id. at 1075.
175
Ann M. Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability in Shareholder Derivative
Litigation: The Delaware Courts’ Response to Recent Corporate Scandals, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 589, 610 (2008) [hereinafter Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability]; see
Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891) (stating that directors have a duty “to
supervise the business with attention . . . [and] to use proper care in the
appointment of agents”).

CP_Kerr (Do Not Delete)

80

7/14/2011 4:17 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:49

decision.” 176 The duty of due care “requires directors to act with
the same ‘amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent
[persons] would use in similar circumstances.’ ” 177 Moreover, the
duty of due care requires directors to “ ‘consider all material
information reasonably available’ in making business
decisions.” 178 The duty of due care is breached once a director,
while making a decision on behalf of the corporation, fails “to act
in an informed and deliberate manner” 179 or simply makes “an
unintelligent and unadvised judgment.” 180
The duty of loyalty is the second facet of the business
judgment rule. “[T]he duty of loyalty mandates that the best
interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes precedence
over any interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling
shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally.” 181
The duty of loyalty, “requir[ing] an undivided and unselfish
loyalty to the corporation[,] demands that there be no conflict
between duty and self-interest.” 182 To illustrate, a director may
be considered “interested” if he or she will receive a financial
gain from a transaction that is greater than the benefit received
by the stockholders, 183 or if the director takes action to avoid the
repercussions of a decision that would impact him or her
Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability, supra note 175.
Bainbridge, supra note 165, at 88 (quoting Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963)).
178
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch.
2005) (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000)), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27
(Del. 2006).
179
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
180
Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass Co., 167 A. 831, 833 (Del.
Ch. 1933)).
181
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); see Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
182
Disney I, 907 A.2d at 751 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939)). The case further states:
A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound
knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule
that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and
inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only
affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his
charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to
the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and
ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable
and lawful exercise of its powers.
Id.
183
See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (citing Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
176
177
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negatively but would not necessarily have the same effect on the
Additionally, a director can be viewed as
corporation. 184
“interested” if he or she “receives a substantial benefit from
supporting a transaction.” 185 The duty of loyalty can also be
breached through self-dealing, the receipt of excessive
compensation, the use of corporate funds to perpetuate control,
insider trading, the usurpation of corporate opportunities, and
competition among the companies of corporate officers and
directors. 186
The third duty of the business judgment rule triad is the
duty of good faith. While “good faith” was a considered in early
business judgment rule cases, it has seldom been the deciding
factor. 187 Moreover, some disagreement exists as to whether it is
a stand-alone duty or a sub-category of the duty of loyalty. 188 In
the past, the duty of good faith was defined in the context of bad
faith, as the Delaware Supreme Court once stated, “[i]n the
absence of a showing of bad faith on the part of the directors or of
a gross abuse of discretion[,] the business judgment of directors
will not be interfered with by the courts.” 189 Bad faith involves a
“fiduciary intentionally fail[ing] to act in the face of a known duty
to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.” 190
Today, the duty of good faith “works as part of the articulation of
the business judgment rule that applies to the directors’ decisionmaking process and it is part of the directors’ oversight
responsibility.” 191 Moreover, the duty of good faith has been said
See id.
Cede, 634 A.2d at 362.
186
See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 306–07,
320–23 (2002).
187
See Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability, supra note 175, at 619.
188
See Kerr, supra note 167, at 1049–50. In Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del.
2006), the Delaware Supreme Court clarified its earlier ruling in In re Caremark
International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), by holding
that failing to implement a system of monitors or controls, or a conscious failure to
use an implemented system of monitors or controls, would constitute a breach of a
director’s duty of loyalty “by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation in good
faith.” Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70.
189
Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492–93 (Del. 1966).
190
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del.
2006).
191
Veasey, supra note 155, at 1455. In In re Caremark, the court stated that a
director owes a duty of good faith to ensure that a corporation has a monitoring and
reporting system, which the board approves, and failure to do so can make the
director liable for damages to the company for illegal activity by employees. See In re
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
184
185
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to “involve all the aspects of honesty and integrity,” 192 and
requires that directors’ motivation stem from “a true faithfulness
and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.” 193 The duty of good faith can be violated by
“intentional or unintentional misconduct[,] reckless behavior
given a certain duration or magnitude[,] conscious disregard of
known risks[,] and behavior that cannot rationally be explained
on any other grounds.” 194
The Delaware Supreme Court recently addressed the duty of
good faith in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 195 where
shareholders sued the board of directors of Lyondell Chemical
Company for not acting in good faith while selling the
company. 196 While the board of directors failed to perform an
auction or a market check before selling the company, 197 they did
meet several times during the week they considered the buyer’s
offer, and the CEO attempted to negotiate better terms for the
transaction. 198 Thus, while the board of directors’ behavior was
not perfect, the Delaware Supreme Court did not find that their
behavior reached the level of bad faith as “the directors’ failure to
take any specific steps during the sale process could not have
demonstrated a conscious disregard of their duties.” 199 The court
also noted that a “vast difference [exists] between an inadequate
or flawed effort to carry out fiduciary duties and a conscious
disregard for those duties.” 200

192
E. Norman Veasey, Seeking a Safe Harbor from Judicial Scrutiny of
Directors’ Business Decisions—An Analytical Framework for Litigation Strategy and
Counseling Directors, 37 BUS. LAW. 1247, 1251 (1982).
193
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); see also In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig.,
No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (elaborating further).
194
Kerr, supra note 167, at 1042.
195
970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
196
See id. at 237.
197
Id. at 243.
198
Id. at 242. Additionally, “the directors were disinterested and
independent; . . . they were generally aware of the company’s value and its
prospects; and . . . they considered the offer, under the time constraints imposed by
the buyer, with the assistance of financial and legal advisors.” Id. at 237.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 243. However, the court suggested that the board of directors may have
breached their duty of care. See id.

CP_Kerr (Do Not Delete)

2011]

7/14/2011 4:17 PM

THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN OF 2008

83

B. Exculpatory Provisions in the Articles of Incorporation
In addition to the business judgment rule, boards of directors
are often protected from liability for their decisions by state
statutes. 201 Indeed, Delaware enacted section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law in response to the Delaware
Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 202 where the
court held directors of a corporation personally liable for
breaching their duty of care in a lawsuit initiated by
shareholders. 203 Section 102(b)(7) allows shareholders to adopt a
clause in their corporation’s articles of incorporation protecting
directors from personal liability for monetary damages for
breaching the duty of care. 204 Since Delaware enacted section
102(b)(7), all other jurisdictions, with the exception of the
District of Columbia, have enacted a similar provision. 205 The
provisions adopted by other states either completely eliminate
holding directors personally liable for monetary damages for the
breach of duty of due care, or instead, allow the articles of
incorporation to eliminate director liability if the shareholders
choose to adopt such a provision. 206 Additionally, virtually every
corporation has adopted an exculpatory provision to address the
situation where the state statute did not eliminate liability but
rather gave corporations the option to adopt an exculpatory
provision. 207

See Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Managerial Liability and
Exculpatory Clauses—A Proposal To Fill the Gap of the Missing Officer Protection,
45 WASHBURN L.J. 307, 307 (2006).
202
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
203
See Honabach, supra note 201; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(2010). Before this case, directors were assumed to not be liable for breaching the
duty of care. Id. However, they could still be held personally liable for breaching the
duty of loyalty. Id.
204
See § 102(b)(7). The statute also provides that the exculpatory provision must
not include immunity from liability for the following: (1) breaching the duty of
loyalty; (2) not acting in good faith, omissions not made in good faith, or acts or
omissions involving intentional misconduct or knowingly violating the law;
(3) unlawful payment of dividends or unlawful stock purchases or redemptions; or
(4) transactions where the director receives an inappropriate personal benefit. See
id.
205
See Honabach, supra note 201.
206
See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L.
REV. 477, 490 (2000).
207
See id.; Honabach, supra note 201, at 313.
201
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C. Shareholder Derivative Litigation208
In addition to the business judgment rule and exculpatory
provisions provided for in articles of incorporation, boards of
directors are protected from liability in lawsuits simply because
shareholder derivative litigation is rarely successful. When
shareholders wish to bring derivative litigation, they face several
challenges that are in place to ensure the litigation will be
valuable, and not detrimental, to the corporation. 209 Thus,
shareholder derivative litigation is often quickly dismissed,
protecting the board of directors. 210 However, through the
growth in shareholder activism, as well as the increase in proxy
access, shareholder derivative litigation is growing and exposing
boards more than ever before. 211
Shareholder derivative litigation has increased and survived
more motions to dismiss post-2001, due arguably in part to the
corporate scandals that occurred in 2001, namely Enron and
Worldcom. 212 While Delaware has not announced new standards
for the business judgment rule, it appears that judicial
enforcement of these standards has changed. 213 Indeed, the
former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Norman E.
Veasey, has acknowledged that Delaware courts are applying
new scrutiny, yet also the “same law,” to defendants in derivative
actions, and that Delaware courts’ “expectations of directors are

208
This Section does not provide a complete discussion of shareholder derivative
litigation, but instead only discusses those aspects relevant to the current issue.
209
See Larry E. Ribstein, Litigating in LLCs, 64 BUS. LAW. 739, 740 (2009).
Shareholder plaintiffs often must place a demand on the corporation or have their
lawsuit approved by the special litigation committee. See id.
210
See generally id. (describing derivative suits).
211
First, in the hopes of increasing shareholders activism, the SEC has taken
steps to make proxy information available on the Internet, making it much easier for
shareholders to submit proxy materials and participate in their corporation’s voting
process. See Blake H. Crawford, Eliminating the Executive Overcompensation
Problem: How the SEC and Congress Have Failed and Why the Shareholders Can
Prevail, 2 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 273, 294 (2009). Additionally, since the
1950s, institutional ownership of shares in corporations has increased dramatically,
with those institutions becoming very active shareholders through the process of
submitting shareholder proposals. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 447, 449 (1991).
212
Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability, supra note 175, at 590, 593.
213
See id.
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evolving.” 214 The best example of this new shift is found in In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 215 where Disney
shareholder plaintiffs survived multiple pretrial motions and the
case subsequently went to trial. 216 While the plaintiffs ultimately
lost, 217 the fact that the case survived so many pre-trial motions
indicates that shareholder derivative litigation may be exposing
boards of directors more than in previous years.
While boards of directors are still somewhat protected from
shareholder derivative litigation, one of the consequences of the
recent change in the American economy is that corporations are
being sued more frequently and for more reasons. 218 Indeed,
more securities class-action lawsuits have occurred since the
financial crisis began. 219 Thus, while shareholder derivative
litigation does act as a way of protecting boards of directors, the
current financial crisis has led plaintiffs to find other ways to
hold directors liable for their poor business decisions.

John Gibeaut, Stock Responses: Shareholders Ask for Changes in Corporate
Governance and the Courts Are Starting To See It Their Way, 89 A.B.A. J. 38, 40
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
215
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
216
See id. at 35; see also In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d
106 (Del. Ch. 2009); In re Nat’l Auto Credit, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A.19028,
2003 WL 139768 (Del. Ch. Jan. 10, 2003); Omni Care, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.,
822 A.2d 397 (Del. 2002); Levco Alternative Fund Ltd. v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 803
A.2d 428 (Del. 2002); Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257 (Del. 2002).
217
See Brehm, 906 A.2d at 35–36.
218
See James L. Sanders, Am I Liable?, DIRECTORSHIP, June/July 2009, at 46.
Not only are boards of directors being sued by angry shareholders, but the
government is increasing its scrutiny of boards of directors through its own
regulatory agencies, including the SEC. See id. Indeed, Citigroup was recently sued
in a shareholder derivative action for excessive payments made to a former CEO on
the basis that the payment was wasting corporate assets. See In re Citigroup Inc.
S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d at 112. In fact, the court denied the motion to
dismiss the claim for corporate waste. Id. at 140.
219
See Alistair Barr, Financial Crisis Triggers More Class-Action Suits,
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 30, 2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/financial-crisistriggers-more-class-action-lawsuits. According to Barr’s article, Stanford Law
School’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse found 220 securities class action
lawsuits in 2008, 173 in 2007, and 115 in 2006. Id. The most recent time that there
were this many class action lawsuits was in 2002, during “the dot-com bust” and the
Enron and WorldCom affairs. See id.
214
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III. THE DUTY OF CANDOR: DELAWARE’S ADDITIONAL DUTY OWED
TO SHAREHOLDERS BY DIRECTORS
In addition to the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders
under the business judgment rule, Delaware, as well as other
states, has developed an additional duty known as the duty of
candor. 220 The duty of candor “flows from the broader fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty.” 221 Sometimes it is credited as being a
stand-alone duty, while at other times it is considered part of the
duty of due care and the duty of loyalty. 222 Over the past twenty
years, it has gained prominence, in part due to the popularity of
exculpatory provisions in articles of incorporation that eliminate
duty of due care suits. 223 As a result, duty of candor violations
and subsequent litigation have become more important to
shareholder plaintiffs. However, because it is unclear whether it
is part of the duty of due care, duty of loyalty, or a stand-alone
duty, courts are inconsistent with how they treat duty of candor
allegations. 224
220
See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 462 (stating that “[c]ourts in states
other than Delaware have recognized the right and utilized the duty of candor
terminology”). Branson points to Persinger v. Carmazzi, 441 S.E.2d 646, 652 (W. Va.
1994), and Potter v. Pohlad, 560 N.W.2d 389, 395 (Minn. App. 1997), as examples.
Id. The duty of candor in Delaware is relevant to this discussion, as the three
corporations profiled in this Article are all incorporated in Delaware. See
BankAmerica Corporation, Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of
BankAmerica Corporation (Apr. 28, 2010), available at http://phx.corporateir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MzM0NTR8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBl
PTM=&t=1; Citigroup Inc., Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Citigroup Inc.
(Oct. 30, 2009), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/corporategovernance/
data/citigroup_rci.pdf?ieNocache=934; General Motors Holding Company, Amended
and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of General Motors Holding Company (Nov.
1, 2010), available at http://www.gm.com/investors/corporate-governance/docs/GM
CertificateofIncorporation.pdf.
221
Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 542 (Del. Ch. 2000).
222
BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 461 (stating that “the [Delaware] court
has been somewhat coy pinning down whether the duty of candor springs from the
duty of care, the duty of loyalty, or is a free standing obligation”). However, the issue
of whether shareholders have been notified of the necessary information to make an
informed decision is not related to the management of the corporation, and thus not
a decision the business judgment rule would protect, supporting the argument that
the duty of candor is not under the business judgment rule. See In re Anderson,
Clayton S’holders’ Litig., 519 A.2d 669, 675 (Del. Ch. 1986).
223
BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 461; see also infra Part II.B.
224
Compare BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 461 (stating that “articles of
incorporation can result in exculpation and dismissal of duty of candor violations, at
least if no self dealing or ‘intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law was
involved’ ” (citing Arnold v. Soc. for Savings Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270 (Del. 1994)),
with Zirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 783 (Del. 1993) (stating that an exculpatory
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Known alternatively as the duty of disclosure, 225 the duty of
candor is breached when directors make “a materially false
statement, [omit] a material fact, or [make] a partial disclosure
that is materially misleading.” 226 The duty of candor does not
create an original disclosure rule, but instead “represents
nothing more than the well-recognized proposition that directors
of Delaware corporations are under a fiduciary duty to disclose
fully and fairly all material information within the board’s
control when it seeks shareholder action.” 227 Furthermore, in
Malone v. Brincat, the Delaware Supreme Court stated:
Delaware law also protects shareholders who receive false
communications from directors even in the absence of a request
for shareholder action. When the directors are not seeking
shareholder action, but are deliberately misinforming
shareholders about the business of the corporation, either
directly or by a public statement, there is a violation of fiduciary
duty. 228

Thus, even if shareholder action has not been requested by the
board of directors, directors of corporations have a “fiduciary duty
to shareholders to exercise due care, good faith and loyalty” when
communicating to the public or to shareholders regarding the
business of the corporation. 229 What is not clear after Malone,
however, is if the information that the directors presented to
shareholders later becomes false, whether it is a violation of the
duty of candor to not communicate the new information to
shareholders. 230
provision did not excuse directors from duty of candor liability). In essence, it
appears that if a duty of candor allegation stems from a violation of the duty of
loyalty or another duty, it can escape dismissal. BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at
461 (citing In re Reliance Sec. Litig., 91 F. Supp. 2d 706, 731–32 (D. Del. 2000)).
225
See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (preferring the term “duty of
disclosure”). However, after Stroud, courts continued using “duty of candor.”
BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 460–61.
226
Pfeffer v. Redstone, 965 A.2d 676, 684 (Del. 2009).
227
Stroud, 606 A.2d at 84; see also Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998)
(stating that “[t]he duty of disclosure obligates directors to provide the stockholders
with accurate and complete information material to a transaction or other corporate
event that is being presented to them for action”).
228
722 A.2d 5, 14 (Del. 1998).
229
Id. at 10.
230
One commentator has suggested that an affirmative obligation to disclose
information when shareholder action is not requested should only occur when either
the scenario is one where the federal laws do not protect shareholders or “where
Delaware law can logically invoke traditional fiduciary duty principles to fill in that
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Thus, under the duty of candor, directors owe a fiduciary
duty to disclose all material information to shareholders in the
following situations: (1) when seeking shareholder approval of
transactions that require a shareholder vote; (2) when seeking
shareholder approval of “invalid or suspicious transactions,”
including self-dealing or compensation transactions; and
(3) when directors willfully communicate to shareholders or the
public about the corporation. 231 As expected, the duty of candor
is especially relevant to the situations of Bank of America.
IV. ADDITIONAL RELEVANT LAWS AND DUTIES DIRECTORS AND
MAJORITY AND CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS MUST FOLLOW
Various common laws and state statutes may protect
directors, but directors still owe fiduciary duties under state law
to stockholders and must comply with federal laws, such as Rule
10b-5 of the federal securities laws. Additionally, majority or
controlling shareholders can owe fiduciary duties to their fellow
shareholders. However, it is unclear whether these fiduciary
duties change when the government begins acting as both an
influence on the board of directors and as a majority or

gap.” Holly M. Barbera, Note, Fiduciary Duties and Disclosure Obligations:
Resolving Questions After Malone v. Brincat, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 578 (2001).
Barbera further suggests that there should be no general disclosure duty when there
is not a request for stockholder action, as there are business concerns regarding
disclosing information to the public and federal laws that protect shareholders. See
id. at 575–76. However, a history exists between Delaware laws and the state’s blue
sky laws, which consequently overlap with federal securities law Rule 10b-5.
Specifically, section 7303 of the Delaware Securities Act states:
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase
of any security . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7303 (2010). As such, in response to the commentator,
simply because the Delaware laws and the federal laws overlap does not mean that
the duty of candor should only apply when no overlap exists and the federal laws fail
to protect shareholders. In fact, the overlap of laws is truly irrelevant because
overlap does not signify that the laws are ineffective. In fact, it is suggested later in
this Article that the duty of candor should be extended to include a disclosure duty
when new material information has been learned that would clarify a previously
made statement. See infra Part V.A.5.
231
See Shannon German, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them: Corporate
Officers’ Duty of Candor to Directors, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221, 233 (2009).
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controlling shareholder. Parts A and B discuss the duties owed
by directors, and Part C addresses the duties owed by majority
and controlling shareholders.
A.

Rule 10b-5

In addition to the duties directors owe to shareholders under
common law, 232 directors must comply with the federal securities
law known as “Rule 10b-5.” Section 10 of the Securities
Exchange Act was created to “protect investors, to help ensure
fair dealing in the securities markets, and to promote ethical
business practices.” 233 Section 10(b) is a “catch-all” provision that
concerns the purchase or sale of a security and covers both
publicly and privately traded corporations. 234 Rule 10b-5 states,
in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange . . . (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading . . . in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security. 235

To prove a section 10(b) violation, the plaintiff—either the
SEC or a private individual 236—must prove the following: (1) that
the requisite jurisdictional means are satisfied; (2) that the
defendant is either a purchaser or seller of the security at issue;
(3) that there was “manipulation” or “deception,” and not merely
a breach of a fiduciary duty; (4) that the misstatement or
omission of fact was material; (5) that the defendant acted with
scienter; (6) if relevant, that the plaintiff relied on the
misrepresentation; (7) that causation is established; (8) that the
manipulation or deception was connected to the purchase or sale
of security; (9) that the defendant had a duty to disclose if the
allegation is based upon silence; and (10) that damages were
suffered. 237
See supra Part II.A, III.
MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 393 (rev. 5th ed. 2009).
234
Id.
235
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
236
BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 517.
237
Id. at 518–19. A material fact has been defined by the Supreme Court as one
that, if omitted, a “substantial likelihood [exists] that a reasonable shareholder
232
233
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In determining whether the scienter element has been
satisfied, most courts have concluded that recklessness is
sufficient. 238 Reckless conduct has been defined as
a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or
even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the
defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware
of it. 239

Such state of mind can be found in a variety of ways. If an
individual does not know a statement is false, yet utters it for
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
238
William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the
Federal Securities Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 121, 179 (1997); see McLean v. Alexander,
599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding reckless conduct to be the “minimum
threshold for liability under [section] 10(b)”); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that “recklessness satisfies the scienter
requirement”); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977)
(holding that “the definition of ‘reckless behavior’ should not be a liberal one,” but
rather “a lesser form of intent”). In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976),
the Supreme Court raised, but did not decide, the issue as to “whether, in some
circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under [section] 10(b).”
Id. at 193 n.12. Furthermore, in an effort to deter abusive securities litigation
practices and reconcile the conflicting pleading standards among the circuits,
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4 (West 2011) (“PSLRA”). Christopher J. Hardy, The PSLRA’s
Heightened Pleading Standard: Does Severe Recklessness Constitute Scienter?, 35
U.S.F. L. REV. 565, 565 (2001). The PSLRA requires a plaintiff, “with respect to each
act or omission alleged, to . . . state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” Id. at 571 (first
alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). While this provision seeks to heighten the pleading standard required of
plaintiffs, the PSLRA’s vague statutory language fails to define the term “strong
inference.” Id. Nevertheless, most circuits have concluded that some form of
recklessness satisfies the scienter element under section 10(b), but they differ “in the
degree of recklessness required.” Id. at 572; see Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187
F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that section 10(b) requires a showing of
“extreme recklessness”); In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th
Cir. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff “must plead, in great detail, facts that constitute
strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct”); In
re Comshare Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that
“plaintiffs may plead scienter [under section] 10(b) . . . by alleging facts giving rise to
a strong inference of recklessness”); In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525,
534–35 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that reckless conduct remains a sufficient basis for
liability under section 10(b)); Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d
Cir. 1999) (holding that simple recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement).
239
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting
Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).

CP_Kerr (Do Not Delete)

2011]

THE FINANCIAL MELTDOWN OF 2008

7/14/2011 4:17 PM

91

others to rely on when lacking affirmative knowledge of its truth,
he or she is considered reckless. 240 Additionally, if an individual
deliberately avoids the truth by failing to consult available
information, a finding of recklessness will likely be made. 241
The most relevant element for the topic at hand concerns
whether the defendant had a duty to disclose. Generally, the
mere fact that a party holds material information does not mean
that the corporation must disclose that material information to
stockholders. 242 Indeed, the duty to disclose hinges on the terms
of Rule 10b-5, which prohibits omissions of a material fact only if
the fact was “necessary . . . to make the statements made” not
materially misleading. 243 In this context, the focus turns on the
presence of a duty to update and a duty to correct. The “duty to
update may exist when a prior disclosure that, although accurate
when made, . . . becomes materially misleading” and continues to
be relied upon by investors. 244 In determining whether a duty to
update exists, courts consider “the significance and type of
information contained in the earlier statement, the predictive
quality of the statement, and the time lapse between the earlier
statement and current information.” 245 The duty to correct
concerns statements that were “materially untrue, incomplete, or
misleading” when they were made. 246 Specifically, “if a disclosure
is . . . misleading when made, and the speaker thereafter learns
of this [fact],” a duty to correct arises. 247 With regards to
projections, even if a statement is accurate when made, but has
forward-looking intent or relates to policies or practices that the
company has stated it will follow, such statement may give rise
Kuehnle, supra note 238, at 192.
Id. at 192–93.
242
See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) (“We do
not hold that whenever a corporation speaks, it must disclose every piece of
information in its possession that could affect the price of its stock.”); Weiner v.
Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In general, [s]ection 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 do not impose a duty on defendants to correct prior statements—
particularly statements of intent—so long as those statements were true when
made.” (citing In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1245 (1989)).
243
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
244
MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES 27 (1984); see Weiner, 129 F.3d at 316 (citing In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881
F.2d at 1245).
245
STEINBERG, supra note 244, at 2-7 to 2-8.
246
Jeffrey A. Brill, The Status of the Duty To Update, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 605, 617 (1998); see STEINBERG, supra note 244, at 2-24.
247
STEINBERG, supra note 244, at 2-24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
240
241
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to a duty to update when it becomes inaccurate because of a
subsequent event. 248 Additionally, as part of what is known as
“Item 303,” when public companies file certain documents with
the SEC, the company must also “[i]dentify any known trends or
any known demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that
will result in or that are reasonably likely to result in the
[company’s] liquidity” materially changing. 249 As expected, Rule
10b-5 is of particular relevance to the government’s interaction
with Bank of America.
B. The Duty of Directors To Be Fair to Shareholders
It is true that “directors of Delaware corporations stand in a
fiduciary relationship not only to the stockholders but also to the
corporations upon whose boards they serve.” 250
However,
shareholders elect the directors to the board, and as with any
election, directors often may know which shareholder, or which
group of shareholders, was responsible for their election. These
directors have been defined as “constituency directors,” or
“representative directors,” as they “represent” a group of
shareholders. 251 Accordingly, similar to other elections, directors
may feel a responsibility to serve the constituency that helped
them obtain their position. However, the board of directors must
serve all shareholders fairly, as they owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation itself and all the shareholders, not just the
shareholders that elected them to the board. 252 Moreover, even if
a director feels a responsibility to a certain constituency of a
corporation or particular block of shareholders, “the directors’
duties to stockholders must trump their concerns for other

See id. at 2-25.
17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (a)(1) (2010).
250
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (citing Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503,
510 (Del. 1939)).
251
E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a
Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW.
761, 763 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Examples of constituency
directors include those “designated by creditors, venture capitalists, labor unions,
controlling or other substantial stockholders, or preferred stockholders; directors
elected by a particular class of stockholders or by a minority interest under a
cumulative voting scheme; or directors representing other constituencies.” Id.
252
In re MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 676 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(stating that “[t]he board owes its fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
stockholders, not merely to a set of stockholders as of a certain record date”).
248
249
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constituencies.” 253 In fact, it has been argued that a constituency
director should always assume that (1) his fiduciary duties are
owed to the corporation and its shareholders; and (2) if the
interests of the corporation and the shareholders are not the
same, a judge may employ equitable principles to reach a
decision as to whether a director breached his or her fiduciary
duty. 254 Therefore, while a director may be aware that a block of
shareholders, such as the majority, was responsible for electing
him or her to the board, this knowledge does not give the director
permission to favor this constituency when making decisions. 255
This duty of fairness is especially relevant to Citigroup and GM,
where the government owns significant amounts of shares in
each corporation.
C. The Fiduciary Duty Owed by the Majority and Controlling
Shareholders to Minority Shareholders
Directors and management owe the traditional fiduciary
duties to shareholders; however, shareholders can also owe a
fiduciary duty to fellow shareholders. 256 Generally, it is the
majority shareholder who owes a fiduciary duty to the minority
shareholders. 257 “Under Delaware [state] law, a shareholder
owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or
exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation.”258
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he majority has
253
Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 251, at 766. Veasey and Di Guglielmo
point out that one constituency, creditors, have other means to protect their
interests, including contracts, fraud and fraudulent conveyance law, bankruptcy
law, commercial law, and implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, among
other laws. See id. at 766–67, 767 n.17.
254
Id. at 767. For further discussion of the duties owed by constituency directors
that are beyond the scope of this article, see id.
255
See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004) (“The primary basis
upon which a director’s independence must be measured is whether the director’s
decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board, rather than
extraneous considerations or influences.” (citing Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927,
936 (Del. 1993)).
256
See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders,
60 STAN L. REV. 1255, 1261–62 (2008). There are three key groups in corporations—
shareholders, the board of directors, and management—each having certain rights,
privileges, duties, and responsibilities. Id. at 1257.
257
See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–14 (Del. 1994)
(quoting Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del.
1987)).
258
Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1344 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985)).
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the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary
relation toward the minority, as much so as the corporation itself
or its officers and directors.” 259
Even if a shareholder does not own the majority of shares in
a corporation, in some situations, he or she can still be a
controlling shareholder through a finding of a dominating
relationship, and thus owe fiduciary duties to fellow
shareholders. According to the Delaware Supreme Court:
[A] shareholder who owns less than 50% of a corporation’s
outstanding stocks does not, without more, become a controlling
shareholder of that corporation, with a concomitant fiduciary
status. For a dominating relationship to exist in the absence of
controlling stock ownership, a plaintiff must allege domination
by a minority shareholder through actual control of corporation
conduct. 260

“Control” and “domination” have been defined as implying “a
direction of corporate conduct in such a way as to comport with
the wishes or interests of the corporation (or persons) doing the
controlling.” 261 Thus, no actual percentage or threshold exists
that qualifies one as a “controlling shareholder,” but instead
one’s behavior determines if one qualifies as a controlling
shareholder. 262 In most cases where a shareholder has been
considered to be a controlling shareholder, he or she has owned
almost fifty percent of the corporation; however one New York
case found a controlling shareholder in a corporation in which
the shareholder owned three percent of the company yet had six
director nominees. 263
S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1919). Additionally, the Court
stated, “[i]t is the fact of control of the common property held and exercised, not the
particular means by which or manner in which the control is exercised, that creates
the fiduciary obligation.” Id. at 492.
260
Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1114 (quoting Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument
Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989)); see Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 122–
23 (Del. Ch. 1971). When the court is discussing an “absence of controlling stock
ownership,” it is referring to an absence of a majority stock ownership. In Kahn, the
court found that minority shareholder Alcatel, U.S.A., a corporation, which held a
43.3% minority share of stock in corporation Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.,
was a controlling shareholder because it exercised control of Lynch by dominating its
corporate affairs, particularly at board meetings with the Alcatel-appointed
directors. See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1115.
261
Kaplan, 284 A.2d at 123.
262
See Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1114; Kaplan, 284 A.2d at 123.
263
See In re Caplan, 20 A.D.2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep’t), aff’d, 14
N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964); Marcel Kahan & Edward
259
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The specific fiduciary duty owed to the minority shareholders
by the majority or controlling shareholders is that of loyalty. 264
The majority or controlling shareholders must not use the fact
that they own the majority of shares or act as the controlling
shareholder of the corporation to dominate the affairs of the
corporation in a way that is advantageous to them such that they
receive a material financial benefit at the cost of the minority
shareholders. 265 However, if a controlling shareholder can prove
that a transaction was still “intrinsically fair” to the corporation
despite also benefiting the controlling or majority shareholder, he
or she can avoid being held liable. 266 Indeed, the Supreme Court
in a seminal case once stated that
a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of stockholders
[is a fiduciary]. Their powers are powers in trust. Their
dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous
scrutiny[,] and where any of their contracts or engagements
with the corporation is challenged[,] the burden is on the
director or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the
transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the
viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein. 267

V. ANALYSIS
The situations concerning the recent financial crisis not only
make for dramatic stories of political power struggles that either
directly or indirectly affect most Americans, but also illustrate
many potential violations of federal and common law corporate
Rock, How To Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware,
and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 743 n.176 (2009). Thus, even
though the government only has a thirty-four percent equity interest in Citigroup—
with only twenty-seven percent of that being in common stock—if its actions are
enough that it is exercising control and domination over the corporation, it will be
considered a controlling shareholder. See supra notes 130, 133, and accompanying
text. See infra Part V.B.2 for a discussion of the government’s duties as Citigroup’s
controlling shareholder and regulator.
264
See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 256, at 1265–66.
265
See id. (citing Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471–72 (Cal.
1969)); see also Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1115; Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,
720 (Del. 1971). A traditional example of the controlling shareholders violating their
duty of loyalty to the minority is in a “freeze-out” merger, where the minority,
thanks to the influence of the majority or controlling shareholders, must sell their
shares at an extremely low price to a corporation owned by the controlling or
majority shareholder. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 256, at 1266.
266
See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 256, at 1266.
267
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (citations omitted).
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laws. Indeed, these situations highlight a brand new territory in
American corporate law: what is and is not legal when the
government interacts with and gains influence and control over
the private sector. Additionally, the financial crisis has led to
hints of change in governmental influence in the corporate sector,
which may only be the beginning of a sweeping change in the
government’s role in business in America.
A.

Possible Legal Issues Arising When the Government
Influences Boards of Directors

As discussed above, the government has exerted its influence
on boards of directors, causing directors to make decisions they
would not otherwise had made if they were acting independently.
However, boards of directors still owe their fiduciary duties to
shareholders, not the government when it is simply acting as a
creditor or stakeholder in the corporation. 268 Thus, boards of
directors, such as the boards of Bank of America and Citigroup,
are likely not immune from liability from the various forms of
protection discussed.
1.

The Duty of Loyalty and the Bank of America Board

First, the business judgment rule may not protect the board
in the event that they have violated their fiduciary duties to
stockholders. For example, if the board of directors of Bank of
America continued in their transaction with Merrill Lynch as a
result of government pressure, the fear of job loss, and selfinterest, violation of the duty of loyalty becomes an issue. 269 In
February 2009, it was revealed that government officials
allegedly told Lewis that they would remove executives and
directors from Bank of America if the company did not follow

268
See supra note 27 for definition of a stakeholder. Creditors are often
considered stakeholders. However, while directors are allowed to consider the
interests of stakeholders when making decisions on behalf of the corporation
through constituency statutes and relevant case law, directors are not required to
consider the interests of stakeholders when making decisions. See Leung, supra note
27; infra notes 334–40 and accompanying text. For further discussion of duties owed
to stakeholders, or more accurately the lack of fiduciary duties owed to stakeholders,
see infra Part V.C.
269
The testimony regarding this issue is conflicting. See supra notes 61–71 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, the board may have acted to help the American
economy, an issue that is further addressed in discussing the duty of care. See supra
notes 65, 276, and accompanying text.
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through with purchasing Merrill Lynch. 270 In response, after
Lewis reported these discussions to the board, Bank of America
continued with the transaction without notifying shareholders of
Merrill Lynch’s $15 billion loss in the fourth quarter of 2008. 271
While the reasons for these actions are unknown, pursuant to
testimony, the board of directors was pressured into buying
Merrill Lynch by the government for the benefit of one very large
“stakeholder”—the United States economy. 272 Thus, when a
director makes a decision under pressure from the government,
while fearing for his or her job to the detriment of the
shareholders, the director is likely failing to uphold the duty of
loyalty owed to shareholders by considering the interests of the
board before the interests of the shareholders.
As discussed in Part II, directors owe a duty of loyalty to the
shareholders of their company. 273 Directors must act selflessly so
that the shareholders’ interests, and not the directors’
interests―or potential benefits―are their absolute priority. 274 If
Lewis and other directors at Bank of America feared losing their
jobs when choosing to buy Merrill Lynch, their selected course of
action likely constituted a violation of their fiduciary duty of
loyalty to the shareholders.
2.

The Duty of Due Care and the Bank of America and
Citigroup Boards

Additionally, the boards of directors of Bank of America and
Citigroup will not be protected by the business judgment rule if
they violated their duty of due care to shareholders by making an
“unadvised judgment” through gross negligence. 275 While many
due care causes of action for monetary damages have
disappeared due to exculpatory provisions and the difficulty of
bringing shareholder derivative suits, the issues here could
See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6.
See Changing Course, supra note 60.
272
See infra Part V.C for a discussion of considering stakeholders when making
a decision on behalf of the corporation and specifically for a discussion about why
this author does not feel that the United States economy is a legitimate
“stakeholder.”
273
See supra text accompanying notes 181–86.
274
See supra text accompanying notes 181–86.
275
See supra note 180 and accompanying text. The standard for violating due
care is acting with gross negligence, and thus an “unadvised judgment” is not just a
simple mistake. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 (Del. 2000).
270
271
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potentially survive a duty of due care cause of action for
injunctive relief. 276 A due care cause of action for injunctive
relief, but not monetary damages, is potentially still relevant for
two “unadvised” decisions made with gross negligence: the failure
to invoke the MAC clause and subsequent purchase of Merrill
Lynch, and the failure to notify shareholders of the MOU. 277
While the merger and MOU have already occurred, if any
remaining issues or transactions in conjunction with these two
problematic decisions exist, they likely would be grounds for
injunctive relief for breaching the duty of due care. 278
Indeed, the board of directors who wanted to enact the MAC
clause knew it was an appropriate course of action in the
situation and in the best interest of the corporation to do so, but
chose to instead complete the purchase of Merrill Lynch allegedly
at the request of the government. 279 Moreover, the board’s
additional decision to not disclose to shareholders the terms of
the MOU that it began operating under in May 2009 may be
viewed as an “unadvised judgment” to withhold material
information that shareholders should have considered when
reviewing the terms of the transaction. 280 This set of facts raises
the issue of a possible breach of the duty of due care.
See supra note 204 and accompanying text (stating that section 102(b)(7)
allows shareholders to adopt an exculpatory provision protecting directors from
personal liability for monetary damages for breaching the duty of care). Of course,
exculpatory provisions do not excuse directors from causes of action for breaches of
the duties of loyalty or good faith.
277
See supra Part I.A. The board of director’s decision to not disclose the
financial condition of Merrill Lynch is not relevant under the duty of due care.
278
For example, if any transactions related to the merger are still pending, such
as the selling of assets, the transactions could potentially be enjoined. Furthermore,
any management or board decisions stemming from the MOU that are still pending
could also potentially be enjoined.
279
See supra notes 61–71 and accompanying text.
280
See supra notes 61–71 and accompanying text. While the government is not
required to disclose the MOU to the public, the board of directors has somewhat of a
choice regarding whether or not to inform shareholders of this agreement. A Form 8K describes the events that trigger a company’s requirement to file a report with the
SEC that in turn notifies shareholders of key news regarding the company. See
Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm (last
visited Mar. 19, 2011). The two relevant provisions of Form 8-K for Bank of
America’s MOU are Item 1.01, which calls for disclosure when a company enters into
a “Material Definitive Agreement,” and Item 8.01, which simply discusses “Other
Events,” or those events “that are not specifically called for by Form 8-K, that the
registrant considers to be of importance to security holders.” See id. While
shareholders would argue that an MOU is material, and thus Bank of America’s
failure to disclose constitutes an unadvised judgment under the duty of due care,
276
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Furthermore, Citigroup’s board of directors’ decision to
remove Kelly as the CFO may be viewed as a breach of the duty
of due care if it was “unadvised” and may also be grounds for
injunctive relief, such as enjoining similar management decisions
in the future. 281 If, however, the board’s decision to remove Kelly
was an informed, reasoned decision, despite the governmental
pressure that was exerted on the board, it will not be considered
a breach of the duty of due care. Boards of directors must act
independently when making decisions, and if Citigroup’s board
independently concluded that it was reasonable to remove Kelly,
then no breach of the duty of due care occurred.
If the government or another third party, however,
influences a board to eject management, whether or not a
decision was informed and reasoned, the decision appears
suspicious. If a decision was made under pressure from the
government, there may have been an uninformed decision and,
thus, one not made with due care. Furthermore, Citigroup’s
board of directors has a duty to be fair to all shareholders, and
the government’s role as a shareholder places suspicion on the
board’s obligation to treat all shareholders fairly. 282 Thus, while
all the facts may not be known regarding the board’s removal of
Kelly from management, it is possible that the board breached its
fiduciary obligations to shareholders by not acting with due care,
which in turn means it may have also violated its duty to be fair
to shareholders.
3.

The Duty of Good Faith and the Bank of America Board

Furthermore, the board of directors of Bank of America may
have violated the third prong of the business judgment rule: the
duty of good faith. 283 As discussed in Part II, the duty of good
Bank of America would likely claim that because it is an informal procedure, where
it is unclear what action would be taken for a violation of the MOU, it does not
trigger a Form 8-K filing obligation. However, because Bank of America’s MOU
involves corporate governance and Item 5.02 requires filing a Form 8-K when a
departure or election of officers occurs, once change happens in corporate
governance, it will be disclosed to shareholders. See id. Thus, while shareholders
have a case for arguing that failing to disclose the MOU is a breach of the duty of
due care, Bank of America’s likely arguments for why they chose not to disclose the
MOU will, in the author’s opinion, win over any potential shareholder arguments.
281
See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
282
See supra Part IV.B.
283
See Kerr, supra note 167, at 1049–51, for a discussion about whether or not
the duty of good faith is a stand-alone duty or part of the duty of loyalty.
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faith requires that directors’ motivations stem from “a true
faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and
its shareholders.” 284 Moreover, violating the duty of good faith
often involves a showing of bad faith, which is defined as a
“fiduciary intentionally fail[ing] to act in the face of a known duty
to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his [or her]
duties.” 285 Conscious disregard is difficult to prove, and thus
distinguishes the duty of good faith from the duty of loyalty,
where a plaintiff only needs to show that a director either was
conflicted between duty and self-interest or did not demonstrate
an undivided loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders. 286
For example, the board of directors in Lyondell failed to take all
of the preferred steps before a merger, 287 but because they took
some steps, and thus did not act with conscious disregard, they
were not found to have violated the duty of good faith. 288 The
Delaware Supreme Court stated that they may have breached
the duty of due care, but their behavior simply did not equate
with conscious disregard and a violation of the duty of good
faith. 289
Bank of America’s board of directors failed to disclose
material information to shareholders that would have corrected a
previously made statement that was now false. However, simply
failing to take action does not automatically mean a director has
violated the duty of good faith; instead, it must be shown that the
director consciously chose to avoid a duty. In the case of Bank of
America, it is unknown if the directors consciously chose not to
inform shareholders of Merrill Lynch’s deteriorating financial
condition because they were considering their own job security or
the interests of the American economy. If these considerations
played a significant role in their actions towards the
shareholders, and if one considers the duty of good faith to be a
284
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); see also In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig.,
No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (“The business judgment
rule [is not] available to a fiduciary who could be shown to have caused a transaction
to be effectuated . . . for a reason unrelated to a pursuit of the corporation’s best
interests.”).
285
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del.
2006).
286
See Disney I, 907 A.2d at 751.
287
See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 237 (Del. 2009).
288
Id.
289
Id.
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separate duty from the duty of loyalty, then they likely violated
the duty of good faith, even though they may have felt such
actions were integral to their patriotic duty.
If the board did not act with conscious disregard in choosing
to not correct their previously incorrect statement, they likely did
not violate the duty of good faith. Nevertheless, their failure to
disclose material information to shareholders may still raise
other legal issues, such as the duty of loyalty, duty of candor, and
Rule 10b-5.
4.

Rule 10b-5 and the Bank of America Board

The SEC recently settled a lawsuit with Bank of America for
$150 million for, among other items, failing to disclose to
shareholders the financial losses of Merrill Lynch. 290 Thus, the
issue of Rule 10b-5 liability between the SEC and Bank of
America has effectively been settled. However, this decision does
not mean that the issue of Rule 10b-5 liability is completely over
with regard to Bank of America’s lack of disclosure to
shareholders since Rule 10b-5 may still be pursued by
individuals in private civil suits. 291 As previously discussed,
Bank of America did not disclose to shareholders (1) the dismal
financial situation of Merrill Lynch, which Bank of America
discovered shortly after the December 5, 2008 shareholder vote
that approved the purchase of Merrill Lynch; and (2) the secret
MOU agreement. 292 Of the ten elements required to prove a 10b5 violation, 293 the elements that will be of issue in a civil suit are
whether there was a duty to disclose, whether the information
was material, and whether the defendants acted with scienter. 294
Because a duty to disclose will arise when an event occurs that
makes a previous statement inaccurate, 295 Bank of America had a
duty to disclose to shareholders the financial losses at Merrill
Lynch, as it would have corrected their previous statements
regarding how it was a good decision to purchase the corporation.
Furthermore, that information will be considered material, as
financial information related to a merger is traditionally
290
291
292
293
294
295

See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See BRANSON ET AL., supra note 151, at 517.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993).
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considered to be material. 296 Even though shareholders had
approved the transaction before the directors learned of the
complete financial condition of Merrill Lynch, the transaction
had not yet been finalized and could have been stopped had
shareholders known. Also, Bank of America likely had an
obligation to disclose the secret MOU agreement, as it impacted
management decisions that shareholders would also likely find
material. 297 The only difficulty in proving both causes of action
will stem from proving scienter. 298 However, as most circuits
have concluded that recklessness is sufficient to meet the
scienter element, Bank of America’s failure to disclose Merrill
Lynch’s financial condition and the existence of an MOU
agreement will likely amount to a “highly unreasonable
omission,” thus satisfying the reckless conduct standard. 299
Initially, when Bank of America first made the statements
concerning Merrill Lynch’s financial condition, the board of
directors likely could not have been held liable, as it did not know
that such statements were false. 300 Conversely, after Bank of

296
A material fact has been defined by the Supreme Court as one that if
omitted, “a substantial likelihood [exists] that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote.” TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 114 (Del.
Ch. 2007) (stating that “a reasonable stockholder would want to know an important
economic motivation of the negotiator singularly employed by a board to obtain the
best price for the stockholders”); Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 532 (Del. Ch.
2000) (stating that financial details withheld during a merger were material and the
board “defaulted on its affirmative obligation to disclose the information” to
shareholders).
297
The MOU called for Bank of America to overhaul its management, and six
directors promptly resigned between May 26 and June 17, 2009. See U.S. Regulators
to BofA, supra note 82. On June 5, 2009, Bank of America announced that it had
elected four new directors to its board. Press Release, Bank of America, Four New
Directors Elected to Bank of America Board (June 5, 2009), available at
http://mediaroom.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=234503&p=irol-newsArticle&
ID=1390236&highlight=. On August 21, 2009, Bank of America announced the
election of the fifth new director to the board. See Press Release, Bank of America,
Bank of America Board Elects Scully as New Director (Aug. 21, 2009), available at
http://mediaroom.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=234503&p=irol-newsArticle&
ID=1390269&highlight=. Finally, on September 21, 2009, Bank of America
announced the election of the sixth new director to the board. See Press Release,
Bank of America, Bank of America Board Elects Holliday as New Director (Sept. 21,
2009), available at http://mediaroom.bankofamerica.com/ phoenix.zhtml?c=234503&
p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1390283&highlight=.
298
See supra notes 237–41 and accompanying text.
299
See supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text.
300
See In Merrill Deal, U.S. Played Hardball, supra note 6.
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America’s management discovered the truth as to Merrill Lynch’s
poor finances, the board of directors’ decision to remain silent on
the issue and to enter into a secret MOU may likely qualify as
reckless conduct. 301 Accordingly, if a plaintiff is able to fulfill the
scienter requirement, he or she will likely succeed in proving the
remaining elements of Rule 10b-5 against Bank of America.
5.

The Duty of Candor and the Bank of America Board

Similar to Rule 10b-5, the duty of candor in Delaware
imposes a fiduciary duty on directors to disclose all material
information to shareholders in situations requiring shareholders’
approval or votes or when willfully communicating to
shareholders or the public about the corporation. 302 Here, Bank
of America had already communicated to shareholders and
gained their approval in early December 2008 about the Merrill
Lynch transaction. However, by mid-December 2008, Merrill
Lynch’s financials were not what had been represented to
shareholders and the transaction was finalized weeks before
shareholders ever learned of Merrill Lynch’s losses and of Bank
of America’s subsequent governmental loan to finalize the
transaction. 303
While the board of Bank of America may not have violated
the duty of candor, or any other fiduciary duties, when it first
requested shareholders to vote on the proposed merger—
although allegations made by Cuomo may indicate otherwise 304—
the board could have violated the duty of candor once it learned
that its previous statements concerning Merrill Lynch’s financial
condition were false. According to Malone v. Brincat, if directors
are not seeking shareholder action, “but are deliberately
misinforming shareholders about the business of the corporation,
either directly or by a public statement, there is a violation of
fiduciary duty,” 305 as directors of corporations have a “fiduciary
duty to shareholders to exercise due care, good faith[,] and
loyalty” when communicating to the public or to shareholders

See supra notes 51–56, 81, and accompanying text.
See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
303
See supra Part I.A.
304
See Cuomo Letter, supra note 39, at 2. Cuomo alleged that some of Merrill
Lynch’s substantial losses “had become known to Bank of America executives prior
to the merger vote.” Id.
305
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 14 (Del. 1998).
301
302
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regarding the business of the corporation. 306 Moreover, this “duty
to disclose fully and fairly all material information within the
board’s control when it seeks shareholder action” applies not only
to proxy statements, but also to “any other disclosures in
contemplation of stockholder action.” 307 In essence, Malone failed
to address the situation of an omission by directors where no
shareholder action is being sought, leaving questions
unanswered as to what qualifies as “shareholder action.”
Once the board of Bank of America learned in mid-December
2008 that the statements made to shareholders before the vote
were incorrect, the board should have disclosed these material
findings before the merger was finalized on January 1, 2009. 308
Although “shareholder action” is generally defined in connection
with a request for shareholder vote or approval, because the
directors of Bank of America could have solicited a new vote after
informing shareholders of Merrill Lynch’s losses, shareholder
action arguably could still have been sought in this context before
the merger was officially finalized. 309 Furthermore, in the
unlikely event that a second vote could not have occurred,
shareholders could still have sought an injunction to prevent the
merger from going forward.
In essence, when further
shareholder action—in the form of a revote or an injunction—
could be taken in response to new material information that
must be disclosed to correct previously made false statements,
the duty of candor should encompass the directors’ decision to
omit such disclosure. Accordingly, under this standard, Bank of
America’s failure to disclose the material information concerning
Merrill Lynch’s financial condition constitutes a violation of the
duty of candor. 310
Id. at 10.
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 710 (Del. 2009) (quoting Stroud v. Grace,
606 A.2d 75, 84–85 (Del. 1992)).
308
While the merger had closed on January 1, 2009, a merger is not truly
finalized until the transaction is consummated.
309
In this context, the board of Bank of America could have issued a revised
proxy informing the shareholders of Merrill Lynch’s substantial losses and seeking a
second vote to approve the merger. As such, the directors would be in compliance
with the duty of candor’s requirement “to disclose fully and fairly all material
information within the board’s control when it seeks shareholder action.” See
Gantler, 965 A.2d at 710 (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992)).
310
If shareholders have an interest in pursuing a lawsuit against the
government for pressuring the board of Bank of America into this decision, it may be
feasible. See infra note 329.
306
307
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B. Potential Conflicts and Legal Issues Arising from the
Government’s Role as Shareholder and Regulator
As previously discussed, the government also serves as a
shareholder in many corporations, including GM and Citigroup.
As both a majority and controlling shareholder in these
corporations, respectively, the government may have already
violated its duties to fellow shareholders or is in a situation
where it could potentially violate its duties to fellow
shareholders.
1.

GM and the Government as a Shareholder and Regulator

First, the government is clearly the majority shareholder of
GM since it owns sixty percent of the company. 311 The White
House released a statement detailing its plans as a “reluctant
shareholder,” 312 and hopefully the government will act in such a
way. As of the writing of this Article, the government has only
appointed five members to the thirteen-person board, 313 and is
therefore complying with the Delaware corporate voting laws. 314
However, unlike controlling shareholders, who do not owe
fiduciary duties to other shareholders unless the other
shareholders prove domination or control, 315 majority
shareholders have the ability to control the corporation and
therefore owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders. 316 The
government cannot state that it is a “reluctant shareholder” and
avoid the duties it owes to the shareholders as a majority
shareholder, while also attempting to control GM in a number of
ways. What is not clear is what happens when the government,
as a regulator, pressures the board of directors, conveniently
side-stepping its role as a shareholder. While the government
may hold the power to influence some issues as a regulator, when
does it cross the line as a shareholder? Specifically, when do its
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See supra note 117.
313
See supra notes 108, 112.
314
According to Delaware General Corporation Law section 212(a), unless
otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, each stockholder in a Delaware
corporation is entitled to one vote for each share of capital stock they hold. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2010).
315
See supra notes 260–63 and accompanying text.
316
See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–14 (Del. 1994)
(citing Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del.
1987)).
311
312
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roles as regulator and shareholder conflict, harming other
shareholders as a consequence? The unclear, conflicting nature
of the government’s dual role as majority shareholder and
regulator is likely to be problematic in the future.
However, potential conflicts and breaches of the
government’s fiduciary duty to fellow shareholders exist
currently. The government, which is pushing aggressive new
fuel-economy and emissions targets, will not only be GM’s largest
shareholder, but also its chief regulator of vehicle fuel-efficiency
standards. 317 As GM is known for making large, fuel-inefficient
vehicles, this situation could become problematic if the
government forces GM—either through regulations or by simply
directly telling it to do so—to manufacture cars that the
government, and not GM, wants to manufacture. 318 Also, fears
have developed that if the government initially pushes new fuelstandards―or safety standards or any other standard on
cars―and the Office of Management and Budget realizes that
the standards will be too costly for GM, and in turn the
government, the standards will be eliminated. 319 While the
government may be GM’s regulator, it is also its majority
shareholder, and thus any action it takes with the company must
involve fulfilling its fiduciary duty to fellow shareholders.
In fact, Congress has already exerted its power over GM’s
affairs. Once out of bankruptcy, GM planned to expand its
imports of cars made at GM factories in China. But after
pressure from Congress, GM agreed to reopen an American
factory to build smaller models that are not currently produced in
the United States. 320 While keeping the factory in the United
States may be best for local workers, it may have been in the best
interests of GM to move the plant to China. 321
King et al., supra note 118.
See id. Some of GM’s most profitable cars are the Chevy Silverado and
Cadillac Escalade, both of which require a significant amount of fuel. See id.
President Obama recently signed new fuel-economy and emissions targets. See id.
Meeting these goals, but maintaining the vehicles that provide a profit to GM, may
be a problem for the government when it is also a shareholder. See id.
319
Id.
320
See id. GM decided to open this factory in the United States during its
negotiations with the UAW. See id.
321
See id. John Casesa, a Wall Street analyst, stated, “The government has
conflicting policy objectives now . . . [that will] create substantial risk to the
government earning a good return on its investment.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
317
318
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Citigroup and the Government as Shareholder and
Regulator

While the government is clearly the majority, and thus
controlling, shareholder of GM, the situation for Citigroup is not
so clear. On July 30, 2009, the government officially became the
owner of thirty-four percent of Citigroup, twenty-seven percent
being held as common stock and the rest as preferred
securities. 322 Thus, the government comprises the largest block
of shareholders. 323 Although thirty-four percent is well under the
fifty percent threshold for being considered the majority
shareholder, 324 shareholders who own less than fifty percent of
the corporation can still be considered controlling shareholders,
depending upon how much control and dominion they exercise
over the corporation. 325
The government’s behavior indicates that it has exercised
enough domination and control over Citigroup’s board of
directors to qualify as a controlling shareholder, despite owning
less than a majority of the corporation, based on the definitions
discussed above. 326 Moreover, no other shareholder owns more
shares than the government, so the government is easily able to
continue exercising dominion and control over the corporation if
it wishes to do so. Currently, the government is successfully
attempting to influence how Citigroup’s board manages the
company, despite owning less than the majority of the
corporation. First, Citigroup spun-off Smith Barney into a joint
venture with Morgan Stanley at the request of federal
regulators. 327 Next, the FDIC pressured Citigroup to restructure
its management, even going so far as allegedly threatening to
lower the government’s confidential ranking of Citigroup if the
company refused to remove Pandit and others from
See supra notes 130, 133, and accompanying text.
See Citigroup Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 19 (Feb.
26, 2010).
324
Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 256, at 1269 (“[A] shareholder who owns more
than 50% of the company’s outstanding shares has become the archetypal
‘controlling’ shareholder.”).
325
See supra notes 260–63 and accompanying text; see also In re Caplan, 20
A.D.2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep’t), aff’d, 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249
N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964) (explaining that a shareholder who owns a small percentage in
the company can still qualify as a controlling shareholder based on his or her actions
as a shareholder).
326
See supra Part IV.C.
327
Paletta & Enrich, supra note 138.
322
323
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management. 328 Accordingly, even though the government only
owns thirty-four percent of Citigroup, it has loaned so much
money to Citigroup through the TARP program that it can
technically still strongly influence the board of directors.
Moreover, similar to the situation with GM, the government also
serves as the regulator of Citigroup.
Thus, the government’s involvement in these corporations
will be interesting to watch, as it certainly can be considered a
majority shareholder of GM and is most likely a controlling
shareholder of Citigroup. The government’s possible role as a
controlling shareholder means that it must exercise caution in its
dealings with Citigroup to ensure that it complies with the
fiduciary duties owed to its fellow Citigroup shareholders. 329
C. Expanding the Definition of a Stakeholder: Can Boards of
Directors Consider the United States Public a Stakeholder?
One of the justifications given for Bank of America’s
purchase of Merrill Lynch, and for its failure to disclose its true
financial state, was that following through with the purchase
was for the overall good of the American economy. 330 The
See id.
In the event that the government breaches the duties owed to other
shareholders in Citigroup, and those shareholders decide to sue, those shareholders
will be in a unique situation, as they would be suing the government. However,
absent an express statutory waiver, the theory of sovereign immunity shields the
federal government and its agencies from suit. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (citing Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988)). Under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the government’s sovereign immunity is
waived for actions that seek injunctive relief. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the
United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim
that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an
official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor
relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States
or that the United States is an indispensable party.
Id. Furthermore, Congress has waived this immunity for a wide range of suits,
including suits that seek money damages. Dep’t of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S.
255, 260 (1999).
330
Crittenden & Hilsenrath, supra note 70. In Bernanke’s Capitol Hill
testimony, he stated the decision to buy Merrill Lynch was “taken under highly
unusual circumstances in the face of grave threats to our financial system and our
economy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, in Lewis’s Capitol
Hill testimony, he stated that he was told by Bernanke and Paulson that the merger
needed to be finalized, or else it would “impose a big risk to the financial system” of
328
329
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altruistic notions of the government forcing boards of directors to
consider the health of the national economy, however impressive,
do not agree with corporate law principals. Traditionally,
directors could only consider the interests of shareholders when
making such decisions; 331 recently, however, corporations have
increasingly considered stakeholders’ interests. 332 As early as the
1960s, an Illinois court stated that “the effect on the surrounding
neighborhood might well be considered by a director,” 333 and the
Delaware Supreme Court has held that directors may consider
stakeholders’ interests when making decisions. 334 Boards of
directors have the right to consider stakeholder interests under
constituency statutes and are also seeking direct approval from
stockholders to do so. 335 The consistency statutes generally
allow, but do not mandate, officers and directors of corporations
to consider stakeholders’ interests when making decisions on
behalf of the company. 336 Those stakeholders generally consist of
the entire United States. Rappaport, supra note 47 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Paulson told Lewis that “the U.S. government was committed to ensuring
that no systemically important financial institution would fail.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
331
See Robert A. Ragazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the
Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 989, 1023 (1993) (“The traditional common law
rule was that, absent proof of a benefit to shareholders, disbursements on behalf of
nonshareholder constituencies were ultra vires.”).
332
See Alissa Mickels, Note, Beyond Corporate Social Responsibility: Reconciling
the Ideals of a For-Benefit Corporation with Director Fiduciary Duties in the U.S.
and Europe, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 271, 272 (2009).
333
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
334
The Delaware Supreme Court has considered directors’ obligations to
shareholders’ interests in four cases, all of which arose in the context of a takeover.
See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)
(reiterating shareholder primacy); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d
1140 (Del. 1990) (allowing the directors to merge with a company when a better
price was offered by another company in order to preserve the company’s culture,
allowing for consideration other than that of the shareholders); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (“[W]hile
concern for various corporate constituencies is proper when addressing a takeover
threat, that principle is limited by the requirement that there be some rationally
related benefit accruing to the stockholders.”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (stating that, in situations involving control of the
corporation, directors are allowed to consider the interests of stakeholders).
Essentially, taken together, these cases state that shareholders come first, unless
special circumstances exist.
335
Mickels, supra note 332, at 290.
336
See Kathleen Hale, Note, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond
Stakeholder Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 829 (2003). The specifics of stakeholder
statutes vary from state to state, with some states only applying them to directors,
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employees, suppliers, creditors, and the local community where
the business is located. 337 However, Delaware has not enacted a
constituency statute, 338 and thus considering stakeholders’
interests in Delaware is governed by case law, which permits, but
does not require, the consideration of stakeholders. 339 It follows
that courts will allow directors―and sometimes officers―to
consider stakeholders when making decisions, but directors and
officers do not owe specific fiduciary duties to stakeholders;
instead, they owe fiduciary duties to the corporation. 340
Considering stakeholders’ interests, in addition to those of the
shareholders, derives from the concept of corporate social
responsibility (“CSR”). 341 Considering stakeholders’ interests, or
being “socially responsible,” can also lead to larger profits, and
thus is one of the many reasons why corporations are encouraged
to engage in CSR. 342
Thus, it may appear that Bank of America’s and the
government’s decision to follow through with the purchase of
Merrill Lynch for the sake of the United States economy was
based on the interests of a major stakeholder, the American
public. However, including the American public as a stakeholder
goes far beyond what is typically considered a stakeholder—

some states only applying them to certain circumstances, and other states only
addressing the specific interests they are allowed to consider. See id. at 833–36.
“Connecticut is the only state that requires directors and executives to consider
stakeholders’ interests.” Id. at 834. The statutes were enacted “to provide corporate
leaders with a mechanism for considering stakeholder interests without breaching
their fiduciary obligations to shareholders.” Id. at 832.
337
See Mickels, supra note 332, at 292.
338
See Hale, supra note 336, at 833.
339
See supra note 334.
340
See Bernard S. Sharfman, Enhancing The Efficiency of Board Decision
Making: Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis of 2008, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 813,
829 (2009).
341
See Colin Marks & Nancy B. Rapoport, The Corporate Lawyer’s Role in a
Contemporary Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1273, 1280 (2009) (defining
CSR as a “business’s responsibility to the wider societal good beyond, but in addition
to, the business’s economic performance”). There are four pillars to CSR: economic
responsibilities, legal responsibilities, ethical responsibilities, and discretionary or
philanthropic responsibilities. Id. at 1273. Discretionary or philanthropic
responsibilities include contributing to “various kinds of social, educational,
recreational, or cultural purposes.” Id. at 1274 (quoting Dirk Matten & Andrew
Crane, Corporate Citizenship: Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization,
30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 166, 167 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
342
See Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate
Social Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 831, 835 (2008).
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generally, the local community. 343 Even if it is argued that the
United States is the community to which Bank of America
belongs, it is this author’s opinion that this community is far too
large to be considered a traditional stakeholder. Bank of
America’s decisions cannot be justified through the umbrella of
CSR, as the directors and officers owe fiduciary duties first to the
corporation. The board may consider stakeholders under CSR,
but only those groups whose interests are impacted by the
corporation—employees, creditors, suppliers, and the local
community. 344 The consideration of stakeholders cannot possibly
extend to the entire economic health of the nation. Therefore,
the justification for not enacting the MAC clause or for not
disclosing to shareholders the financial health of Merrill Lynch
for the benefit of the American economy does not have any merit
under any corporate law theories or doctrines.
D. Golden Shares: The Future of Government Interaction in the
Private Sector in the United States?
In addition to analyzing the current blurry legal lines of
governmental interaction in the private sector, it is important to
reflect on what may become a trend in government regulation
and ownership of American corporations if the government
divests its interests in the companies discussed. If the United
States government opts to divest its interests in private
companies but retain ownership and control, the United States
will be engaging in a concept similar to that used by foreign
governments to protect national security interests. 345 Through
the concept known as “golden shares,” many foreign governments
retain influence in corporations without actually owning a single
The golden share attaches special rights to the
share. 346
government, allowing the government to veto or approve
company decisions. 347 Thus, the government can exercise control
See Mickels, supra note 332, at 292.
See id.
345
See Marcelo Moscogliato, Foreign Direct Investment in Corporations:
Restrictions in the United States and Brazil on the Grounds of National Defense, 9
OR. REV. INT’L L. 67, 102 (2007).
346
See Christine O’Grady Putek, Comment, Limited But Not Lost: A Comment
on the ECJ’s Golden Share Decisions, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2219, 2220 n.4 (2004).
347
See id. The United Kingdom first started utilizing golden shares in
corporations in the 1980s, specifically “as a means of protecting its sovereignty and
national security.” Christopher M. Weimer, Note, Foreign Direct Investment and
343
344
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over certain companies, which can in turn represent entire
sectors of the economy, despite the fact that the companies are
private. 348 Some governments, including those of Brazil and the
United Kingdom, claim that national defense needs justify
creating golden shares, as golden shares can encourage economic
privatization while at the same time allowing governments to
have a say in key defense corporations. 349
The most obvious comparison to an American golden share is
the government’s current ownership stake in many corporations
discussed in this Article.
While beginning the process of
divesting some of its substantive interests in companies, the
government has also begun to increase its regulatory power—a
move that further enables the government to exert influence and
control over corporations. One example of such activity is the
government’s decision to appoint a pay czar, Kenneth
Feinberg. 350 Feinberg announced in October 2009 that the
salaries for 175 employees at companies receiving government
aid will be cut, with the majority being lowered to under
$500,000. 351 Additionally, the annualized total pay level of the
impacted companies will be fifty percent less than in the previous
year. 352 Those companies include Bank of America, Citigroup,
and GM. 353 While cash salaries will be reduced, employees will
still receive salary in stock that cannot be accessed for at least
Owning shares in these corporations and
four years. 354
National Security Post-FINSA 2007, 87 TEX. L. REV. 663, 678 (2009). It began with
the privatization process of firms owned by the government, with the government
only retaining specific rights. See id. at 679. For example, some golden share
provisions include “the requirement that the British government sign off on any sale
of Rolls-Royce’s nuclear operations, the requirement that the [British] government
accede to any purchase of more than a fifteen-percent stake in British Energy, and
the capability to oversee business decisions in the firms comprising the system of
Royal Dockyards.” Id. at 678.
348
See Moscogliato, supra note 345, at 99, 101.
349
See id. at 102.
350
See Deborah Solomon & Dan Fitzpatrick, Pay Slashed at Bailout Firms,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2009, at A1. The Treasury Department created a “pay czar”
after the drama surrounding the bonus payments at AIG in March 2009. Id.
351
Id.
352
Aaron Luchetti et al., Fed Hits Banks with Sweeping Pay Limits, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 23, 2009, at A1.
353
Solomon & Fitzpatrick, supra note 350. AIG, GMAC, Chrysler Group LLC,
and Chrysler Financial have also been affected by the pay czar’s actions. Id.
354
See id. The Obama Administration had Feinberg connect compensation to
long-term performance in order to stop “employees from taking unnecessary risks for
short-term gains.” Id.
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maintaining control over the salaries at these corporations,
among the other regulatory powers already conferred upon the
government, provides the government with unprecedented access
to and control over corporations. The government has the right
to regulate corporations; however, there is a point when
regulation will exceed its acceptable limit, and that time may
have come. Moreover, it is as if the government is setting up the
mechanisms and regulations now to control corporations in the
future once its interest as either a creditor or shareholder has
been divested. Thus, the stage is being set for the concept of
golden shares to be exercised in the United States.
Of course, in other countries the justification for golden
shares is protecting a nation’s national security interests.
Protecting a nation’s economic health may be just as important
as protecting the nation’s security interests. However, the ability
to protect the security of a nation through the issuance of golden
shares is fairly limited, as only a small number of corporations
engage in this sector of the economy. On the other hand, the
number of corporations whose success is vital to the economic
health of the nation is enormous; in fact, almost every major
corporation could be considered to be vital to the economic health
of the economy. Is allowing the government to have a voice in
every corporation’s decisionmaking process essential to the
health of the American economy? Has the time come when the
economic health of the nation is a national security issue? If the
government’s influence in Bank of America’s purchase of Merrill
Lynch and partial ownership of GM and Citigroup is justifiable
on these grounds, what is next?
It may only be a few
corporations now, but it could potentially be the beginning of
strong governmental influence in corporate boardrooms across
the country and the subsequent rewriting of American corporate
law. While the government is not technically issuing golden
shares, its behavior appears to mark the beginning of what may
become the issuance of golden shares in America.
CONCLUSION
Although one often assumes that the government and the
private sector should not become intertwined, during desperate
times it can arguably be a welcomed source of quick relief.
Certainly, it was, for the most part, well-received during the
Great Depression when approximately fifteen million people
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were out of work and the government developed many programs
in the hopes of creating jobs and stimulating the economy. 355
However, in the case of the corporations discussed in this
Article—Bank of America, GM, and Citigroup—only time will tell
if the government’s intervention was not only necessary to their
survival, but also crucial to the survival of the American
economy. Even if the government’s intervention in the private
sector was necessary, one should not wait to explore what is
already apparent:
The government’s intervention has
significantly blurred American corporate laws.
Indeed, the government’s intervention may have clearly
wiped away boards of directors’ protection under the business
judgment rule and may have exposed them to liability under the
triad of traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty, due care, and good
faith, as well as the duty of candor, the duty to be fair, and Rule
10b-5. Additionally, the government’s new role as a majority or
controlling shareholder and creditor has raised many vital
questions about the fiduciary duties the government owes
shareholders when it serves as both a corporation’s chief
regulator and majority or controlling shareholder. Even if the
government’s actions in these three corporations prove to be
effective, this behavior may not be effective in future situations.
Furthermore, the government’s current behavior may be setting
the stage for the practice of golden shares in the United States,
which would dramatically change the way in which the
government interacts with corporations. Thus, it is important to
evaluate the current situation not only to ensure that if corporate
laws were violated in 2008 and 2009 that they will not be
violated in the future, but also to monitor what may be the
beginning of a dramatic change in government ownership and
the regulation of American corporations.
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See ZINN, supra note 1, at 386–87, 392–93.

